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Introduction 
 
Somewhere shortly after the twenty-fourth of September 1666, Leonard Du Fresnes, 
secretary to the French minister of Foreign Affairs, received a package sent from the 
colony of Nouvelle-France. Inside were a letter and an account of a certain Jacques 
Cailhaut de La Tesserie, prominent colonial bureaucrat and one-time member of the 
Sovereign Council, the highest judicial body in the colony. The letter was a thank-
you note for the interest shown by Du Fresnes’ enquiry concerning de La Tesserie’s 
prior occupations. It also contained details on recent events in the colony, most 
prominently that of a campaign against the Iroquois, who had tormented the French 
colonials for the better part of the century, and with whom the French local 
authorities now hoped to deal once and for all.  
The account itself detailed the career of de La Tesserie in the service of the 
Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. The writer was hoping to convince Du 
Fresnes to use his authority within the civil service to procure for him a position in 
the new Compagnie française des Indes orientales, created in 1664 with the express 
intent of taking over part of the lucrative Asian trade from de La Tesserie’s erstwhile 
employers, the VOC. The author stated that he was very knowledgeable of the places 
and routes of the southeastern lands, and that he had long experience in the 
navigation of ships there.
1
 Because of this experience, de La Tesserie believed that he 
would be capable of doing the French state a great service.  
From the above account and letters, as well as sources in the colonial archives 
of France, Canada and the Netherlands, a picture can be formed of de La Tesserie as 
an all-round colonial careerist straddling early modern boundaries. In the span of 
thirty years he served in such far-flung places as the jungles of Formosa, the empire 
of Japan, the trading hub of Batavia, the coasts of Persia and India, the Canadian 
Shield and the Hudson and St. Lawrence river valleys. During this time he fought the 
Spanish, Chinese and Iroquois, participated in trading ventures across the Chinese 
Sea and Indian Oceans, was an associate of a pelt-trading consortium in northern 
Canada and member of the highest governmental organ of French North America, 
even serving shortly as its governor-general.  
The sheer intrepidness and courage of men like de La Tesserie making the 
long, arduous and deadly voyage to trade with, explore, conquer and settle distant 
places have always been the stuff of myth, story and history-writing. Out of interest, 
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MD France 2135, fol. 51. 
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if not simple necessity due to the radically different environments in which they 
arrived, such persons often fell into a category of people whom recently have become 
of interest; the so-called cosmopolitans. In the words of Margaret C. Jacob: ‘being 
cosmopolitan in Europe during the early modern age meant – as now – the ability to 
experience people of different nations, creeds and colors with pleasure, curiosity and 
interest’. Cosmopolitans were in effect citizens of the world, transcending the 
boundaries which early modern society drew between people, such as religion, class 
or nationality.
2
  
The divisions which separated early modern people, and which were thus 
traversed by these cosmopolitans, were very real, however. Even if people in the 17th 
century did not share our modern concepts of nationalism or class, they did envision 
divisions between groups of people, and often acted upon these. A certain group 
identity was very much present in the thoughts of early modern people, as can be 
inferred from such acts as the formation of regional societies in foreign countries, the 
contrasting of different peoples by writers, or wholesale discrimination of marginal 
groups.
3
 State organizations would often actively reinforce such cultural boundaries 
by barring certain groups from lucrative positions, higher taxations, occasional 
harassment, prosecution, expulsion or eradication. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam has 
shown though several case studies in his book Three Ways to be Alien, those with 
cosmopolitan identities were rarely valued by their host societies. More often than 
not, such men were tolerated for their knowledge or connections, or saved for 
political use in the future, but states could never really bring themselves to trust those 
who had proven a propensity to shift identity.
4
  
To describe this process of self-invention and identity adjustment, Stephen 
Greenblatt coined the term “self-fashioning”. Greenblatt postulated that early modern 
societies had a firm image of how they expected its members to behave, dress and 
speak. More often than not, the potential of individual opportunity and freedom was 
closely tied to public conformation of this ideal, with those choosing a different path 
ostracized as pariahs. Many men were thus prone to fashion their public identity in 
response to cultural pressure from their surroundings, so that it was more congruent 
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with reigning social mores. Doing so enabled opportunities and ensured respectability 
in the eyes of their peers.
5
 
However, in the areas where political and cultural control was weaker, such as 
the outlying colonial areas of the early modern European states, and where influences 
of other cultural systems were stronger, friction could easily arise between the old-
rooted identities and new insights; it is not an aberration that all of Subrahmanyam’s 
case studies took place in the colonial sphere. In their book on the imperial careers of 
British inside the British Empire of the 19th century, Lamberts and Lester made the 
case that whenever people moved, they were obliged to align homegrown concepts of 
gender, race and class with their new surroundings. Through this continuous interplay 
between the situation on the ground and the more abstract concepts related to group 
identities, methods of interaction between European colonizers and indigenous 
groups developed. This effect proved especially dominant when attempts were made 
to transplant ideas and systems from one area to another, in which a process of 
generalization, comparison and eventual hybridization took place. Often enough, the 
travelers reinvented themselves, adjusting their identity to the situation at hand.
6
  
Travelers were thus especially prone to cosmopolitan tendencies, and the 
concomitant problems with cultural boundaries these tendencies created. Because 
integration into a different host society by default necessitated a certain assimilation 
of local customs, such men were often required to adjust their own identity and 
beliefs in profound ways. These adjustments, and the consequences thereof, included 
among others more considered articulation of local peoples and customs, engagement 
in the local society, the creation of new networks of family and friends, or the 
yearning for an idealized home.
7
 In light of this propensity of early modern men to 
fashion different identities in response to different cultural mores, the lives of 
travelers thus hold important lessons regarding the cosmopolitan for the historian. In 
many ways such men formed the cockpits in which different identities were formed, 
came into contact, shared and clashed, and from whom thoughts on identity were 
passed on to others. Because cosmopolitan careerists had knowledge of multiple 
cultures and countries, they often formed the primary vector through which 
knowledge from one area to another was passed on. In effect, with his carrying over 
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of experience obtained in his various occupations, de La Tesserie became part of 
what Huigen, de Jong and Kolfin call a ‘knowledge network’, through which 
knowledge of faraway places and potential methods of interaction were carried by 
various individuals along the networks of colonial posts and strongpoints back to 
Europe.
8
 Many took with them the notions of places where they had resided prior to 
their move and the memories and ideas they formed of these places could also steer 
the action undertaken in their new occupations.
9
 
Cosmopolitans like de La Tesserie could thus use the knowledge acquired 
during their travels to create further opportunities for the advancement of their own 
lives. This did not mean however that they could react to every opportunity, as 
choices were often restricted by the demands made by potential employers. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned friction between home and abroad could as easily 
put off the travelers as form an incentive for them to broaden their horizon.
10
 At the 
same time, choice could as easily be driven by the mundane, such as illness, personal 
loss, or simple wanderlust or boredom. As such, many factors were in play when an 
individual was to decide on a course of action, ranging from those which are often the 
purview of historical writing, such as culture, warfare or politics, to the events only of 
importance to the individual, such as family, loss, and marriage.  
It is the aim of this paper to bring into focus which factors were present in the 
decision-making process of de La Tesserie, and to what extent they were significant. 
To answer the question posed, this work will retell the three distinct phases through 
which the life of de La Tesserie ran. During each of these phases he attempted to 
carry through, a choice which would radically alter his life. The first is de La Tesserie 
joining the VOC, the second is him exchanging the VOC for the colony of Nouvelle-
France, and the third is his attempt to join the CFIO. Every choice has been divided 
into three further parts, each detailing the background in which the choice was made, 
which factors might have contributed to it, and how the decision eventually played 
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out. Thus a picture has been painted of how a young man from France ended up in 
Canada, with a detour through the Far East.  
One practical problem needs to be addressed before tackling the subject. This 
is the relative shortage of documents giving direct insight into the mind of de La 
Tesserie, not uncommon when writing about the early modern period. Such a 
shortage however need not be an insurmountable barrier. As Michael McDonnell puts 
it, regarding his effort to write the life story of Charles de Langlade, Franco-Indian in 
the pays d’en haut of Canada in the 18th century: ‘[…] I set about trying to re-create 
the different contexts in which Langlade lived, to understand the conditions in which 
he was able to live such a mobile and seemingly rich life.’11 By sketching the 
circumstances in the different regions and of the peoples with whom de La Tesserie 
interacted (and was interacted upon) and using the memoires of contemporaries who 
lived and worked in similar conditions in addition to the sources directly and 
indirectly mentioning him, it is possible to create a window into the world of de La 
Tesserie, and see the underlying currents and events which drove his life. 
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Chapter 1: Noble mercenary of the Dutch 
 
The background and upbringing of Jacques Cailhaut de La Tesserie in and of itself 
formed one of the most important factors in the way his later career with the Dutch 
East Indies Company and the colony of Nouvelle-France would take shape. This 
chapter is dedicated to the circumstances of his birth and education, and the vistas 
these opened up to him concerning his potential career possibilities. 
 
1.1 Noble backgrounds 
 
De La Tesserie was born in the late 1620’s in the small village of Saint-Herblain, near 
the city of Nantes. According to a census made by Jean Talon, intendant of Nouvelle 
France, in 1666, de La Tesserie was thirty-seven at the time, making his date of birth 
1629.
12
 He was the second son of Samuel Cailhaut, seigneur of La Gröezardière, and 
Louise Le Tessier, the daughter and only child of the lord of La Tesserie. The 
Cailhauts could trace their ancestry back to seigneurs from the Breton pays de Retz in 
the early 15
th
 century at the least and belonged to the noblesse d’épée, the old French 
martial nobility. They were also active in the local administration, holding positions 
in local councils and the French military.
13
 Another branch of the family owned a 
seigneurie called La Chevrotière nearby, and further members of the family lived near 
the port of La Rochelle, where de La Tesserie still had connections in 1666.
14
  
 In 1621 the lands of La Tesserie were added to the holdings of the elder 
Cailhaut in the will of his mother-in-law. In the tradition of splitting up the family 
lands between the different sons, these were subsequently given to Jacques Cailhaut, 
most likely upon his majority. It is from these lands that he probably derived his last 
name, as it was common in early modern France for the nobility to add the name of 
their largest holding to their given and family name.  
 As second son and possible seigneur in his own right, de La Tesserie would 
have gotten a thorough education in the courses deemed relevant by contemporaries 
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 J. Talon, Recensement de Nouvelle-France de 1666 (Québec, 1666) 65. 
13
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referring to de La Tesserie himself. 
14
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for young noblemen towards a life in the French military and bureaucracy.
15
 These 
would have included the studies of history, geography, mathematics and languages, 
training in arms and horseback riding.
16
 The most important aspect of education 
however was writing, as young nobles needed to be able to emulate the conduct of the 
higher nobility, which laid large stress on the maintenance of networks of family, kin, 
friends and superiors.  
 By the 17
th
 century, a formulaic manner of writing had been created which 
was necessary for any aspiring nobleman to adhere to if he was to be heard. The 
manner of writing was one clear indicator of birth and capacity, with a predilection 
for long flowing sentences, the result of a society which was still to a large extent an 
oral one. Because of this, the ‘saying’ and ‘hearing’ of what was written obliged the 
reader to a response, much as is the case in spoken language. These features can also 
be seen in the writing of de La Tesserie, who in one of his letters states that ‘[…] je 
vous diray que la campagne a mieux reussi que je ne croyois […]’, emphasizing the 
great success of a campaign against the Iroquois in Canada by explicitly assuming 
personal responsibility for what he was claiming.
17
 However, writers were often also 
apt to claim they saw an event to underscore both the importance and the certitude of 
its happening.
18
  
 Another important aspect was the content. ‘Letters between nobles are arenas 
for exchange. Their exchanges include courtesies as well as the seemingly more 
concrete favors – what is usually regarded as patronage.’19 The letters nobles wrote 
each other were often filled with individual professions of esteem, as well as more 
formulaic salutations and other forms of address. By naming himself ‘vostre tres 
humble et tres obeissant serviteur’ de La Tesserie puts himself in a position of 
supplication towards Du Fresnes, from whom he hopes to get a position in the new 
French East Indies Company. The extensive memoire he added to his letter is thereby 
meant as a currency of exchange for attaining this goal. The exchange was reinforced 
by the addition of two otter pelts with the letters, which were meant not only as a 
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favor, but also to have Du Fresnes forward him money for his trip to France, in case 
he was granted a position.
20
  
It is clear from the above that Jacques Cailhaut was knowledgeable in the art 
of letter writing and the maintenance of patronage networks, indispensable skills in 
the noble society of early modern France. Furthermore, his extended family could 
have given him the advantage of a potential network along which he could have 
gained information and obtained favors. Some hints and possible payoffs hereof will 
be discussed in later chapters. 
 
1.2 French Huguenots 
 
The other important aspect of de La Tesserie’s youth were the Protestant beliefs of 
his family. The writings of John Calvin had found a fertile breeding ground in France. 
By the 1560’s over two million out of a total population of eighteen million called 
themselves Huguenots. The urban middle classes and the gentry proved especially 
susceptible to these teachings, and many converted to the new faith, with large 
congregations concentrated in the northern cities and the southern countryside.
21
 The 
Cailhauts themselves were Huguenots of the old stock, and de La Tesserie himself 
stated that during his time in the VOC he too professed the faith.
22
 
 The Huguenot predominance in the bureaucracy soon created friction between 
it and the Catholic majority, exploding in bouts of internecine warfare all throughout 
the 16
th
 century, commonly known as the French Wars of Religion. For more than 
three decades this conflict tore France apart, causing hardship and hatred on both 
sides. By 1598 the fighting had died down and Henry IV, himself a converted 
Huguenot, ensured the veneer of a Catholic victory by converting to Catholicism as a 
condition to gaining the crown in 1589.
23
 However, he also placated his Huguenot 
subjects by issuing the Edict of Nantes: Catholicism became the state religion of 
France, but the Huguenots were given a large degree of religious freedom and 
political rights, as well as the control of certain cities to safeguard them from possible 
Catholic reprisals.  
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21
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139. 
23
 He is rumored to have said ‘Paris vaut bien une messe’, indicating a large degree of pragmatism in 
his public expression of faith. Henry IV’s subsequent actions make it questionable if he had lost all 
personal goodwill towards the protestant faith upon his conversion. 
10 
 During the first decades of the 17
th
 century the balance was maintained by the 
Crown. Catholic discontent over the political rights of the Huguenots however caused 
their rights to be progressively rescinded in those areas falling outside the purview of 
the Edict of Nantes. The Huguenots, fearing a resumption of bloodshed, undertook to 
resist the Crown in 1620, fortifying their remaining strongpoints and awaiting the 
royal assault. Unlike the years before these uprisings proved unsuccessful, and under 
the vigorous leadership of the Cardinal de Richelieu the last embers of resistance 
were stamped out during the siege of La Rochelle in 1628 (in which other Cailhauts 
might well have been involved).  
 The peace of Ales a year later concluded the last organized Huguenot uprising 
in France, whereby the Huguenots lost all rights to hold political assemblies and 
garrison fortified towns which they had held previously; they thereby lost their 
political independence, and were left at the mercy of the Crown.
24
 In the years 
between 1629 and 1660, French domestic policy alternated between curbing 
Protestant legal rights and gaining their loyalty as counterweight against Catholic 
hardliners.
25
 Because the personal safety of the Huguenots was increasingly 
dependent upon the goodwill of the Crown, Huguenot identity became strongly 
intertwined with the stressing of their loyal submission to the state, as it was the state 
which upheld the Edict of Nantes, defining the parameters of their congregation and 
political rights and obligations.
26
  
 However, the state-spanning organization which the Huguenots had created 
during the upheavals of the Religious Wars had also fostered a distinct feeling of 
community, further reinforced by the uniform ‘French’ tongue which came to be used 
during their services. This was even more so for the growing flood of Huguenots 
moving abroad to escape the stifling atmosphere of France. These refugees continued 
to seek contact with family and co-religionists from their home country, forming 
networks which reached between many of Europe’s larger towns but centered on 
France where the majority of Huguenots still lived.
27
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1.3 Huguenot mercenaries serving abroad 
 
For a young nobleman like de La Tesserie the start of a career with the state was 
through distinguished service in the army. By attaining glory and getting one’s name 
known to superiors, young noblemen could quickly rise in rank, unlocking new 
possibilities for more advanced service or a position in a lucrative government 
position as a result. Where the scions of the larger noble houses would often start as 
an aide-de-camp to a commander, the less well-off served as simple foot soldiers in 
the ranks.
28
 As most armies held a bias towards the promotion of men of noble stock, 
young aristocrats could expect rapid advancement if they came to the attention of 
commanding officers.
29
  
The remembrance of the vicious ending of the last Protestant revolts by the 
Crown early in his youth, and the growing number of barriers which were thrown up 
to block Huguenots from more and more bureaucratic and military posts might have 
caused disenchantment for de La Tesserie’s chances in France itself. Next to serving 
in the French army and bureaucracy there were however other ways to find the glory 
and experience de La Tesserie was looking for. From its origin, French Calvinism 
had been heavily militarized, both because of the large numbers of the noblesse 
d’épée within its ranks, and because of the high degree of organization the small 
Protestant congregation had needed to impose on its members to resist the larger 
numbers of Catholics.  
During lulls in the fighting in France itself, large numbers of Huguenot nobles 
would travel to other countries as mercenaries. The most notable of these employers 
were the rebellious states of the Low Countries. Lacking a solid population base to 
recruit soldiers but abounding in money, the protestant United Provinces hired whole 
regiments of foreign troops to fight in their wars against the Catholic Spanish. In 
1599 the Huguenots made up a whole regiment in the Dutch army, and by 1602 over 
three thousand men were active in twenty-one companies.
30
 For the Huguenot 
nobility it became a rite of passage to serve for a season in one of the permanently 
maintained mercenary companies. Their mobilization often happened via affinity 
connections such as kinship networks and extended clienteles, and it would therefore 
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(Aldershot 2007) 12-22. 
12 
not have been difficult for a young Huguenot nobleman to find a place in one of 
them. 
This seems to be exactly what de La Tesserie did. In 1644, when he was 
fifteen or sixteen, he was present at the siege of Sas van Gent (see map 1).
31
 In an 
attempt to further isolate the port of Antwerp from the outside world by closing of the 
Scheldt to shipping, the Dutch government had decided to capture the town, which 
would give them a strong base from which to control the route to Antwerp. 
Commencing the siege on the 28
th
 of July, the Dutch dug extensive fieldworks, 
closing in the city from all sides. During this siege de La Tesserie stated that he learnt 
the art of surveying and the building of fortifications, which he mentions as a great 
help in later endeavors.
32
 It is possible that he was attached to one of the military 
engineers trained and employed by the Dutch to direct the laying of entrenchments. 
University-trained, these engineers were accomplished mathematicians and physicists 
who formed a special branch attached to, but not part of, the army. This innovation 
was the result of long years of besieging and defending the Dutch cities against the 
Spanish, and they were often instrumental in the quick and methodical capture by the 
Dutch of major Spanish strongholds throughout the 17
th
 century.
33
 
So too in the case of Sas van Gent. Shortly after the completion of the Dutch 
siege works a Spanish relief force arrived. It restricted its actions to ineffectively 
bombarding the Dutch entrenchments, withdrawing shortly afterwards, when the 
Dutch positions proved too powerful. This in turn led to the surrender of the Spanish 
garrison on the 5
th
 of September 1644. After leaving a garrison of their own, the 
Dutch army marched back to its permanent encampments at Bergen op Zoom, where 
most troops were decommissioned.
34
 By November de La Tesserie was again free to 
choose a new career, and present in the heart of the Netherlands to do so. 
 
1.4 Contained cosmopolitanism? 
 
Up to this point de La Tesserie was clearly following a path trodden by many others 
of his background. Service with a friendly Protestant nation abroad ensured the full 
range of options denied to the Huguenot nobility in France. Furthermore, fighting in 
the armies of the Dutch Republic did not mean an act of disloyalty towards the 
French Crown. The Dutch campaign against Sas van Gent had been part of the larger 
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drama of the Thirty Years War, fought by the Protestant forces against the Catholic 
Habsburg Emperor and King of Spain. France, for reasons other than religion, had 
chosen the side of the Protestants in 1635, invading the German Empire and the 
continental possessions of Spain. The campaign leading to the siege of Sas van Gent 
had formed part of a larger invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in 1644, where the 
French had invaded from the south, capturing the fortress of Gravelines on the 28
th
 of 
July that year.
35
  
To the French Crown, the mercenary service of its Huguenot populace was 
therefore not necessarily a negative thing, as it propped up one of its allies, while at 
the same time removing a troublesome group of men from its territory. An added 
advantage to the French Crown was the expertise these men brought back to France. 
The Dutch army was regarded as the most advanced army of its time, and men who 
had served in its ranks were eagerly sought elsewhere for their expertise. It is no 
strange thing that a large number of the generals in French service were Huguenots, 
as they were some of the most veteran soldiers the Crown could hire at the time.
36
  
What might be said about the cosmopolitan character of de La Tesserie’s 
endeavors at this time is much less clear. Although he clearly left his home to 
experience other cultures and peoples, this still happened through a distinctly 
Huguenot framework. As mentioned, the Huguenot regiments were recruited mostly 
through old networks of allegiance, and would therefore not have contained many 
with backgrounds differing from those of the young, noble soldiers-for-hire. Serving 
in such a regiment might thus to a large extent have mitigated the necessity of 
interacting with those of other beliefs and affiliations, even if said regiment served on 
battlegrounds abroad. It is possible that a soldier of its rank-and-file interacted with 
others outside his immediate circle only on an irregular basis, so that development of 
concepts of interaction might well have been impossible. If this is true, than the 
cosmopolitan character of such a career-path might well have been minimal. 
One final detail to point out is that Huguenots in general proved to be highly 
apt at adopting the culture of a host country. Many of the Huguenots quickly took on 
the identity which adapted most readily with that of their hosts. This was in large part 
possible because the culture the Huguenots brought with them was that of the French 
upper classes, which was increasingly becoming the norm in 17
th
 century Europe. 
Through imitation, the culture of their hosts came to resemble their own, facilitating 
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integration.
37
 Trim called to attention the fact that “rather than being only strangers in 
strange land, Huguenots had multiple identities they could adopt, facilitating their 
adaption and assimilation […].”38  
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Chapter 2: Foreign service with the VOC 
 
Having been discharged from the army, de La Tesserie was faced with deciding if he 
should return home or find employment elsewhere. In the end, de La Tesserie took 
service with the VOC, drawn to the East because of a ‘curiosité de veoir les Indes 
oriantalles’.39 This was not an unprecedented decision for young men to make, but it 
did involve circumstances which were wholly different from those of a Huguenot 
nobleman in the Dutch European military, as the following chapter will show.  
 
2.1 Joining the VOC 
 
De La Tesserie’s above reason to make the arduous voyage into the unknown was 
hardly uncommon among contemporaries, many of whom also stated a similar reason 
for their travels. However, those men who left strictly for pleasure were a happy few. 
Most hoped to combine learning or curiosity with commercial activities, so they 
could return from the Orient rich in experience as well as money. Others went as 
missionaries, to convert the heathens to Catholicism, or as emissaries to Eastern 
potentates.
40
 
Nor were the reasons to leave always positive ones. Many joined to escape 
poverty or debt: Anthony van Diemen, who would later climb the hierarchical ladder 
of the VOC to become Governor-General in 1636, was originally a merchant from 
Amsterdam gone bankrupt, who had joined the Company to get away from his 
debtors.
41
 Some fled to escape oppressive regimes, such as Guillaume Chenu de 
Chalezac, a Huguenot who escaped Huguenot persecution in France in 1686. He was 
shipwrecked near the Cape, where he was found by the Dutch. De Chalezac 
subsequently joined the VOC until the time family members secured his discharge 
and return journey.
42
 Others were instead pushed to join by family members, to 
escape an awkward home situation caused by ‘certain passions’, in the words of Jean 
Guidon de Chambelle, a Parisian Huguenot who joined the VOC the same year as did 
de La Tesserie.
43
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Furthermore, the presence of others of the same city, country or religious 
affiliation already with the Company could be an important facilitator for men 
making the choice to travel to the East. As will be shown later this chapter, patronage 
and affiliation were important factors in success, especially for those men starting 
low on the hierarchical ladder, but with aspirations to climb it as quickly as possible. 
De Chambelle, mentioned above, stated that he had letters of recommendation which 
would facilitate his stay in Batavia. On the strength of these letters he was even 
capable of swaying another Frenchman he had met in Amsterdam to join him to the 
East, instead of heading to America, as had been that man’s original plan.44 A friend 
who had accompanied him to the Netherlands to see him off safely was even capable 
of acquiring for him a place in the captain’s cabin for the voyage to Batavia, a sure 
sign of the power of his connections as this exempted de Chambelle from all work on 
board, a privilege normally only granted to high officials.
45
  
A well-known example of such potential connections was that of Francois 
Caron; a Huguenot whose parents had fled to Brussels around the time of his birth, he 
signed on as cook’s mate in 1617, climbing up to become leader of the VOC factory 
in Japan in 1639-1640, and Director-General in 1647.
46
 Another was that of Isaac de 
l'Ostal de Saint-Martin. Born into a noble Huguenot family in Béarn in 1629, he 
joined the VOC as common soldier somewhere in the 1650’s, being named lieutenant 
in 1662 and rising to be the commander of all troops in Batavia by 1672. Ultimately, 
de l’Ostal was appointed to the General Council of Batavia in 1687, in which position 
he remained until his death in 1696.
 47
  
 
2.2 Servants of the Company 
 
Much as was the case with the Dutch army, the VOC lacked a component of vital 
importance: manpower. A lot of research has been done into the manpower 
requirements of the VOC, and it is generally accepted by modern scholars that in the 
years between 1595 and 1795 nearly one million men were transported to Asia to 
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work as merchants, sailors and soldiers, a third of whom in the 17
th
 century.
48
 On a 
year-to-year basis for the 17
th
 century, this amounted to nearly three thousand able-
bodied men. For a country which at the time held no more than two million 
inhabitants such a drain would have been intolerable. The VOC made up for this 
shortage by drawing recruits from the surrounding countries. Drawn at first to the 
Netherlands by the plentiful job-possibilities in that country’s booming economy, 
many joined the VOC lured by tales of riches, or simply to see the world. In the later 
1630’s the percentage of foreigners in the Company had been about thirty percent, 
and this number had risen further to forty-two by 1660.
49
  
 It is impossible to create an accurate picture of the national composition of the 
servants of the Company, or the percentage of Frenchmen it contained. However, 
some insight can be gleaned through the study of the records of the VOC. From a 
sample of five hundred eighty-four men recorded on twenty-two ships between 1633 
and 1699, twenty-two hailed directly from France. This would mean that a rough four 
percent of all men on board were French, or twelve thousand men for the 17
th
 century 
alone. To this should be added such men who had drifted to Dutch towns earlier, and 
put those down as their places of origin. However, it must be noted that most of the 
data which has survived comes from the VOC-factory at Middelburg. This port, 
geographically the closest to France, would thus naturally also have attracted most 
French recruits. Many more ships departed from Amsterdam, and these ships held 
lower numbers of Frenchmen. All in all, the number of Frenchmen sent out to the 
East was probably lower than the twelve thousand calculated earlier, but to state that 
the VOC employed a large number of servants from foreign extraction seems 
plausible.
50
  
 In his extensive research on Germans in service of the VOC, van Gelder 
furthermore found that the average age of forty-eight Germans upon their hiring was 
twenty-four. Eighteen did leave their parental home around the age of seventeen to be 
apprenticed or to enjoy schooling before they joined the VOC. However, even these 
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men were around twenty-five upon their departure.
51
 This meant that de La Tesserie 
was both part of a relative minority when he travelled to the East, and was very 
young compared to his colleagues. These facts would have a large impact upon his 
subsequent career.  
 
2.3 Institutional discrimination 
 
For all the great numbers of foreigners the VOC hired, it was however an extremely 
discriminatory institution. According to Pieter van Dam's Beschryvinge van de 
Oostindische Compagnie, the VOC was unwilling to recruit people who were 
suspected to adhere to ‘de paepsche religie’ or those ‘van eenige delicten betigt’. 
Furthermore, the VOC was not allowed to hire ‘Franschen, Engelsche of Schotten, 
selfs niet als bootsgesellen, soldaten of andersints’. An exception could be made for 
‘Oosterlingen en Noorluyden’, i.e. Germans and Scandinavians, but this was only 
allowed in times of extreme shortage.
52
  
 The aforementioned manpower shortages ensured that these regulations were 
honored mostly in the breach, but the VOC nonetheless ensured that the highest 
positions were exclusively given to Dutchmen, preferably those with ties to its 
administrators. Its employees of foreign stock were restricted to the lowly positions 
of soldiers or sailors. This ensured that an overwhelmingly large part of the troops in 
the garrisons and armies of the VOC in the east were of foreign descent, to the extent 
that one observer noted that the language of the majority of the garrison in Batavia 
was German.
53
 
The Dutch commanders and governors often belittled the quality of their 
foreign soldiers, citing unpreparedness and lack of loyalty and commitment. Late in 
1649 de Chambelle, who has been cited previously, quarreled with a Dutch lieutenant 
from another company in Malacca. Over drinks the two men argued over the martial 
spirits of the French people, a situation only diffused by a superior sending the Dutch 
lieutenant away. A few days afterwards the lieutenant again insulted de Chambelle, 
with both men coming to blows. Before blood could be spilled the head merchant 
passed by, who had de Chambelle apprehended and thrown in jail. The VOC 
maintained the death penalty on any of its employees pulling a sword to injure 
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another, but de Chambelle had the luck that several onlookers had been present, who 
insisted he acted in self-defense. After spending ten days in prison, de Chambelle was 
released without charges and in full honor, while the lieutenant was ordered to ask for 
forgiveness.
54
  
Another important aspect of Dutch discriminatory policies was its virulent 
anti-Catholicism. It accepted none in its ranks who were avowed Catholics, nor did it 
allow sermons in the territories under its control. Van Hille lamented that there was 
nowhere to express his Catholic faith, as there were no priests for him to confess 
too.
55
 However, this did not mean that there were no Catholics serving with the VOC. 
Religious affiliation could be easily hidden, and we shall see in later chapters that 
there were Catholic congregations and priests present in Batavia. Nor did such 
affiliation bar men from climbing the social ladder, as long as they did not publicly 
express their beliefs. One high official on Formosa would remark to a Portuguese spy 
that he was a convinced Catholic, but that officials did not really mind as long as he 
held the outward appearance of a Reformed Protestant.
56
 
This drawing of ethnical or national boundaries was not only institutional, but 
felt with the rank-and-file also. The different nationalities held an antagonistic 
relationship to each other, and brawls between the groups were common.
57
 Many 
servants instead had a powerful feeling of community with those people hailing from 
the same cities or areas as they themselves did, and formed supportive communities 
for new arrivals from the same areas. Jan van Hille, doomed in as sense not because 
of his language (he was Flemish) but his religion (he was Catholic) stated he often 
received news from his hometown of Bruges through new arrivals from the city, and 
regularly sent word himself to his parents to notify the families of others that their 
son was still alive.
58
  
   
2.4 Dutch colonial hierarchy 
 
Another peculiarity with which de La Tesserie would have to contend was the 
colonial hierarchy which the Dutch had created in the East. The upper layer of the 
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VOC was formed by the Dutch merchants; these men held absolute power over all the 
servants in the possessions of the VOC. The Council of Batavia, which governed the 
VOC in Asia, consisted of the governor-general, who was assisted by fifteen 
advisors, assembling twice a week to discuss matters pertaining to the Company at 
large. Administrative positions in outlying factories were headed by men similarly 
appointed from the merchant class, as were most of the trading missions and 
diplomatic functions.
59
  
For most of the early 17
th
 century the appointment to such sectors happened 
exclusively in the Netherlands, and was exclusively reserved for Dutchmen. Even for 
well-educated young men from foreign extraction, pedigree was not an assurance for 
obtaining a good position. The case of Johann Sigmund Wurffbain is instructive. The 
son of the major of Nuremberg, he had obtained a good education, spoke Dutch and 
French and possessed many letters of recommendation. However, he was only 
allowed to join as midshipman in 1632, much as was the case with de La Tesserie 
twelve years later.
60
 As the colonial community grew in the East however, foreign 
servants of long experience in the VOC could be promoted to the post locally. This 
opened the possibility for foreigners of long service and sufficient integration to also 
aim for the top of the hierarchy. However, to be eligible, these men had to be of 
proven ability as well as be ‘Dutch’, i.e.: speak Dutch and be of the Reformed faith.61 
As mentioned earlier, no foreigners were allowed to ship out to the East with 
a rank in the civil service, instead commonly being placed in the military arm. The 
social gap between the two arms of service was wide, and very few saw chance to 
jump it. Even if the criteria of ‘Dutchness’ and proven ability were reached; 
promotion to the ranks of civilian personnel could prove elusive. A regular system of 
advancement was missing, causing promotion to be largely dependent upon 
connections with superiors, cover letters, recommendations and other forms of 
patronage. The connections to others with a high post was all-important; Gerrit 
Aansorgh, a Dutchman who had arrived in Batavia as onderkoopman in 1755, 
lamented his passing by the Council for lucrative positions in one of the outlying 
posts, in favor of new arrivals with better letters of recommendation. Because his 
resources of living were reaching their limit, he wrote that his only salvation could 
come from his uncle obtaining better recommendations in the Netherlands for his 
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use.
62
 De l’Ostal, who we saw at the end of the previous chapter, had been a soldier 
who had made the jump through his connections to Rijcklof van Goens and van 
Reede tot Drakestein, both important men in the Company. 
Such a network could be built while on the job, through showing intelligence 
and wits, but this took time. Many of the men who reached the highest ranks through 
climbing the hierarchical ladder often took decades to get there. In a detailed study on 
the Company personnel serving in Bengal in the 18
th
 century, dividing up the 
hierarchy in six steps, Lequin estimated that it took on average six years to progress 
one step, with advancement often taking place upon reenlistment after each further 
stint of five years. Many of the servants in his study served for several decades before 
they could reach one of the higher posts, and most never got there at all.
63
 
Potential climbers of the hierarchical ladder thus had some moments of 
opportunity. The most important one was the high death rate with VOC servants from 
all ranks. Simply through longevity men could outlast their superiors, and take their 
place. Another possibility, especially important in the early period of VOC control, 
were the new opportunities created by the expansion of its territory, and the new 
posts created to ensure their control. Military men, who normally saw few of their 
members cross over to the civilian class, could win distinction in the field, using their 
renown to boost themselves to higher posts. This meant that, even though the 
hierarchy of the VOC was quite prohibitive to quick advancement, there were 
possibilities regardless for those of lower ranks and other nationalities to climb the 
hierarchy.
64
 
 
2.5 De La Tesserie’s opportunities 
 
The examples above show that there were a number of important Frenchmen in 
service of the VOC, and that contact was maintained between those at home and 
abroad, possibly facilitating the decision for others to join. The help of such powerful 
men could have greatly influenced the decision by a young man like de La Tesserie to 
travel to the East, in the expectation of support and a lucrative position upon arrival.  
Nonetheless, de La Tesserie’s chances for a profitable career with the VOC 
would have seemed slim at the outset of his voyage. He shipped out as a common 
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soldier, the lowest rank in the Company, and he was of a national minority, which, 
due to the discriminatory policies and outlook of the VOC, would seriously hamper 
his chances of advancement. In van Gelder’s study on Germans serving for the 
Company, it becomes clear that very few ever reached a higher post. For those lucky 
few who did, the most important route of advancement were through connections and 
the contacts with higher-placed persons. Talent and hard work alone were only rarely 
rewarded; instead, a soldier looking for advancement was to make himself known to 
his superiors, build local networks and comport himself admirably, so as to catch the 
attention of the higher echelons.
65
  
 However, de La Tesserie also held several advantages. Firstly, to put it 
bluntly, he did not die on the voyage to Batavia, nor in the years afterwards. De 
L’Ostal’s story shows that, if circumstances permitted, a soldier could climb the 
hierarchical ladder. To do so however also meant that said soldier would have to stay 
alive, a difficult prospect in the disease-ridden possessions of the VOC. This de La 
Tesserie seemed to have done admirably: leaving the Dutch East Indies in 1655, he 
would serve the Company for ten years, which would have turned de La Tesserie into 
an experienced colonial servant simply by virtue of his time in service. Secondly, 
from a remark made about de La Tesserie in later sources it was clear that he had 
learnt Dutch either during his time in the Dutch army or during his service with the 
VOC.
66
 This made him much more amenable to the Dutch command, who were 
adamant that all of its higher personnel spoke Dutch. Lastly, de La Tesserie’s French 
Calvinist background would have ensured that he was also admissible to the 
Company on the basis of his religion and, as has been pointed out earlier, French 
noble culture was highly conductive to integration elsewhere in Europe. 
 For de La Tesserie, a cosmopolitan approach would thus have been paramount 
if he wanted to establish himself in the East. Only by understanding the laws of the 
VOC, learning the Dutch language and imitating Dutch customs could he hope to be 
appointed to more lucrative positions. To do so required long years in often lowly 
service to the Company. Furthermore, it was entirely possible not to do so at all, as 
the case of de Chambelle showed. After four years, de Chambelle’s contract had 
expired, and due to his inability to learn Dutch, he had decided to return to France.
67
 
Such men, possibly the majority of the foreign servants of the VOC, remained in their 
own circles, suffering discrimination by the Dutch merchants as a result. For them, 
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not trying to understand the Dutch rules in the East would only lead to 
disappointment. De La Tesserie however seemed to have escaped this fate.  
24 
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Chapter 3: De La Tesserie´s first years in the East 
 
The first years of de La Tesserie with the VOC are primarily marked by a dearth of 
information on his own career in general, as well as grievous shortcomings in his 
account of events. Nonetheless, they laid the basis for his subsequent travels. The 
following chapter will deal with these events, as well as the world into which de La 
Tesserie arrived when he set foot ashore at Batavia. 
 
3.1 Travel to Batavia  
  
Having made the decision to travel to the East, de La Tesserie sailed for Batavia from 
Middelburg on the 8
th
 of January 1645. His fleet carried 647 men, of whom 236 were 
soldiers and the remainder sailors.
68
 The route taken to get to Batavia was extensively 
detailed by the cartographers of the VOC. Having knowledge of the prevailing winds 
and currents, the directors sent out their ships in the months between Christmas and 
Easter. This ensured the fleets could catch the winds and tides which enabled the 
swiftest voyage to the East, a necessity as long sailing times had a deleterious effect 
on the personnel.  
The fleet of de La Tesserie passed along the Canaries before turning south-
west, towards the coast of Brazil, to catch the favorable winds. From there the ships 
turned east again, reaching the Cape, which they passed without stopping. In short 
notice, the ships then crossed the Indian Ocean, passing through the Strait of Sunda 
before arriving at Batavia on the 18
th
 of June 1645.
69
 The whole voyage had taken 
162 days, which lay far below the average measured for the period of 1640-1649 of 
two hundred days.
70
 The short duration did not however prevent a similar number in 
deaths as on the longer journeys that year. De La Tesserie himself stated that the total 
number of deaths on both ships was fifty-four men, a number collaborated by the 
Council of Batavia.
71
 This meant that eight percent of the men onboard had died, 
exactly the same for that decade in general. The relative high death rate was probably 
caused by the skipping of layover moment at the Cape, which meant that the sailors 
had been confined to their ships for far longer than was normally the case. 
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Regardless, somewhat less than 236 soldiers landed at Batavia, to be distributed 
between the guard units and the main garrison.  
 
3.2 Describing Batavia 
 
The Batavia De La Tesserie arrived to was a colonial society in the grip of rapid 
growth. Founded in 1610 as safe alternative to the port of Bantam, the VOC had 
permanently shifted its headquarters to the new town in 1619. Batavia quickly 
became the focal-point from where trading ventures were organized, military 
expeditions prepared and goods stocked for eventual shipment to Europe. The town 
also attracted large numbers of foreigners, drawn by the unprecedented trading 
opportunities the city offered.
72
 By the time of de La Tesserie’s residence the most 
important fortifications had been built, but the great population surges of the second 
half of the 17
th
 century, which would turn the town into a metropolis, were still a 
decade away.
73
  
According to de La Tesserie, the main fort was very large, cornered by four 
large bastions and covered by channels, which protected its walls from direct assault 
and connected it to the main town. The town itself was a square, surrounded by walls, 
which were protected by three bastions and several smaller redoubts, all of which 
were topped with cannons. The main citadel contained the residence of the Dutch 
governor, as well as the principal magazine and a garrison of two hundred soldiers. 
The number of soldiers in the town itself fluctuated due to demands on Dutch 
manpower elsewhere. Both the troops in the fortress and whoever was present in the 
town were headed by a colonel, while the policing of the town was in the hands of a 
force of seven hundred local citizens. In the event of a siege these troops could be 
augmented by twelve hundred black freedmen, as well as three hundred Javanese, 
‘armés que de piques et christes’. There were also many Chinese, but they were not 
allowed to carry arms.
74
  
The primary occupation of the soldiers in the town was garrisoning the central 
fortress and the surrounding strongpoints. The garrison also formed a reservoir of 
men from which the Company could draw for the manning of expeditions. De La 
Tesserie himself would remain in Batavia for two years, in which time he was 
engaged hunting pirates in the employ of the sultan of Mataram, a longtime enemy of 
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the Company.
75
 An example of this activity was when, according to the 
Daghregisters of Batavia, fifty Mataramese prows were active near Batavia, where 
they had attacked Javanese shipping sailing for the city.
76
 The work would have been 
tedious to the soldiers involved, but it was an important activity to the Company, 
which relied upon clear lines of trade and communication for its ventures.  
Such descriptions permeated the account of de La Tesserie’s travels. As his 
work was meant to inform the French government of the holdings in the East, and 
what they could expect if they would ever try to capture strongpoints of the other 
European powers, this type of information would be exactly what his requesters 
would have wanted. As he himself stated that he was well educated in fortifications, it 
is implicit that the knowledge he had of local strongholds would be very accurate and 
specialist. Strangely enough, however, he makes no comments on the weakness of the 
surrounding walls, which were of an older design then was in use in Europe at the 
time, and would not have afforded sufficient protection to the town in the event of a 
European-style siege. This was a conscious policy used by the Dutch everywhere 
they built, as they promoted the defense of their main strongholds and depots over 
that of the abutting town. This might call into doubt over his claim of being trained in 
fortification-building, as it was a defect many similarly trained contemporaries did 
note.
77
 
 
3.3 The Dutch colony of Fort Zeelandia 
 
After participating in a disastrous naval campaign in the Philippines, de La Tesserie 
was sent as part of reinforcements to the Dutch garrison of the colony on Formosa in 
1647 (see map 2).
78
 There he was made a lieutenant, opening a dynamic career in the 
Far East. Fort Zeelandia, the central fortress on Formosa, was built as part of a plan 
by the Dutch to reroute Chinese trade into their own hands, working in concert with 
their attempts to concentrate power and the commerce of the Chinese Sea trade at 
Batavia, and the subsequent campaigns against their major rivals, the Spanish in 
Manila and the Portuguese in Macau. A fleet had been sent to the coast of Fujian in 
1622 to force access to major Chinese outlet ports, but was defeated shortly 
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afterwards. However, not wanting to lose the possible assistance of the Dutch against 
the Portuguese, the governor of Fujian convinced the former to settle on Formosa 
instead. There the VOC possessed a good position to keep in contact with Chinese 
merchants on the mainland and to control the (illegal) trade between China and Japan, 
for which the unclaimed island proved a perfect go-between.
79
  
Formosa was also the source of large herds of deer roaming the western plains 
of the island. The natives hunted the animals, using deer products for such various 
purposes as clothing, food or currency. The author was not the only European to 
comment how healthy and well-dressed the locals were, because of the abundance of 
dear meat and skins.
80
 However, the majority of venison and skins were bought, 
refined and shipped abroad by Chinese merchants, who had been doing so long 
before the arrival of the Dutch. Fujian province, ever on the brink of starvation, 
bought venison in great numbers, while the Japanese used skins for the production of 
armor and ceremonial clothing. Even before the Dutch started commercializing the 
process in the 1640’s, Formosa was already exporting tens of thousands of skins to 
Japan, often with profits double the buying in price.
81
  
 To tap into these trades, the VOC chose to base their warehouses at a natural 
harbor on the southwestern portion of the island.
82
 The harbor consisted of two sand 
dunes separating the sea from the bay behind, with a canal with the distance of a six-
pound cannon shot separating both. According to de La Tesserie, this entrance was 
difficult to navigate, and many ships were lost there.
83
 However, the harbor itself 
ensured a safe haven for ships traveling between Batavia and Japan.  
The northern tip of the southern island contained the fortress and storehouses. 
Built in 1624, these structures were connected to the mainland by a dike which was 
crossable at low tide. The fortress itself consisted of four bastions, placed upon a 
piece of land overlooking the entrance. The remainder of the island was also well-
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fortified: a heightened road stretched along the harbor, ending in two other bastions, 
and another redoubt protected the entrance to the dike. The garrison contained some 
two hundred men, forming the military reserve of the colony.
84
  
 The town abutting the fortress held some one hundred-fifty European 
civilians. The majority of its population however consisted primarily of Chinese who, 
according to de La Tesserie, numbered around ten thousand inhabitants by 1647.
85
 
Serving as merchants, workers, fishermen and the other myriad jobs which kept 
colonies running, these Chinese communities were prevalent in all European colonial 
positions, and indeed in most trading hubs in East Asia. The Spanish city of Manila 
often had to deal with unrest stemming from its large population of Chinese, while 
Batavia also held several thousand Chinese in the same period. It was the hope of the 
Governor-general and the Council to eventually ensure that Fort Zeelandia would 
take up the same position as Batavia did as central entrepôt for all trade in the area, 
and other travelers commented that the new town held all possibilities of becoming 
exactly that.
86
 
 
3.4 The Formosan countryside under Dutch governance 
 
Ever since building Fort Zeelandia, the Dutch endeavored to take control over the 
hunting and trading of deerskins on the plains inland. To do so, they were forced to 
expand their control over the native villagers, first in the immediate surroundings, 
collectively known as the Siraya, and later further to the North and South (see map 
4). Opposition however was harsh and sustained. In an extensive description of the 
peoples of the island, Olfert Dapper in his work Gedenkwaardig Bedryf der 
Nerderlandsche Oost-Indische Maetschappye mentioned that the island was dotted by 
large numbers of villages, which lived in a continuous state of warfare with each 
other. This warfare consisted largely of raids and counter raids, in which subterfuge 
and treachery were commonplace. The men fought mostly with bow and arrow, 
taking up shields and axes only when they went in for the kill. The Formosans 
preferred to take the heads of the men they killed, which afforded them status at 
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home, and possibly was a perquisite for the advancement to manhood.
87
 De La 
Tesserie concurred that warfare was their inclination, and that they did not give 
quarter, although neither were they cruel. Peace between villages was made with the 
exchange of pigs as payment for the kills made during the conflict.
88
 
The Formosan natives farmed the coastal plains, planting rice, corn, wheat, 
millet and fruits. Dappert made note that their farming techniques were very primitive 
compared to those of the Dutch or Chinese, and that the Formosans only produced 
enough food to sustain themselves and their families.
89
 De La Tesserie himself 
mentioned the same, and added that the local people on the plane left much land 
uncultivated, sowing only around the immediate surroundings of their houses. They 
also fished large quantities of fish immediately off the coast, although by the time of 
de La Tesserie’s presence, this work had largely been taken over by Chinese 
newcomers, who exported their catches back to China, paying taxes to be allowed to 
do so.
90
 The agricultural shortcomings eventually moved the Dutch government to 
rely much more on Chinese colonists for the production of foodstuffs to maintain 
their garrison and for the export to their other posts. 
Although the VOC had not planned for its colony to be anything more than a 
strongpoint and safe harbor from which to dominate the nearby trade routes, it was 
quickly drawn into the local power politics of the Siraya, the southwestern plains 
area. This extension of Company power was largely a reaction to rogue Chinese, 
Japanese and Spanish competition for the island’s natural resources, but the internal 
logic was driven by the Protestant preachers who had followed the soldiers ashore. 
These men went out to the native villages, trying to convert the locals to the 
Protestant faith. Their conversion efforts proved especially effective in the village of 
Sinkan, where they soon had a small congregation built up.
91
 
 When these congregations came under attack by rival villages, the preachers 
pushed the Dutch government to intervene in favor of their flock. Initially met with 
setbacks, one of which involved the ambush and massacre of sixty-three soldiers in 
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1629, the Dutch were obliged by their alliances and for the maintenance of their 
status as most powerful group in the Siraya to chastise the hostile villages one by one, 
and ensure their subjugation to Dutch control. This ensured that throughout the first 
decade of their presence on the island they were involved with expeditions and 
fighting against the neighboring towns, trying to gain a peace through the show of 
force. By 1636 eventually, this process had largely been completed, and the local 
villagers had either been pacified or exterminated.
92
  
 To govern their new allies and secure continued peace, the Dutch set up a 
bureaucratic system which incorporated the various areas into its structure. The 
structure revolved around the meeting of regular landdagen. These landdagen were 
forums where Dutch military power could be displayed, and where the right to govern 
could be conferred by the VOC to the local chieftains through the handing out of 
regalia supposedly connected to the position. Although the landdagen were annual 
events in the western areas which formed the heartlands of Dutch power, they also 
assured at least a formal presence in the less controlled areas to the North, East and 
South of the island, a point also observed by de La Tesserie himself.
93
 
He would have been in a good position to notice such politics, for soon after 
serving in the garrison of Fort Zeelandia, de La Tesserie was made politiek (political 
minister) in one of the allied native towns.
94
 This employee was tasked with 
overseeing the application of Dutch law where matters of importance for the VOC 
were concerned, especially maintaining the peace between the tribes and the 
regulation of the produce of the deer hunts. Initially, the position was filled by the 
clerics already present in the villages, who had done so much to expand Dutch 
control over the countryside. The VOC preferred to use them over its own employees, 
both because of the knowledge of native languages of the former, as well as the 
contact they had built up during their residency.
95
 
As the colony became better established, and its interests in the local 
countryside increased (of which the reasons will be discussed in the next chapter), 
more use was also made of regular servants. Partially, this might have been the result 
of a greater affinity of its administrators with the local language and culture. De La 
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Tesserie himself stated that, in the two years he spent in the countryside, he learnt to 
speak their language naturally.
96
 Also, the VOC increasingly tried to separate the 
clerical and political duties. This process was completed when, during an extensive 
re-organization of the administration in 1651, clerics were officially barred from 
political duties.
97
 
For de La Tesserie, these changes would have meant much in the way of 
career opportunities. The need of observers and administrators in the countryside of 
Formosa meant that ready jobs were available for ambitious men, and political 
expansion of Company control over the countryside meant a corresponding net 
increase in such employments. If his claim of having learnt the language is to be 
believed (and his insights in their culture seem to reaffirm this claim), he would have 
joined a select group of Company officials whom the VOC was willing to advance in 
position and pay extra.
98
  
 
3.5 Trading on the high seas 
 
However, de La Tesserie did not only confine his activities to the island itself. 
Halfway into 1649, under pretext of a bad health and thus needing to recuperate in 
other climates, he was able to convince the governor to let him join a ship sailing to 
Japan. The ship arrived at Deshima, the main Dutch outpost, on the 17
th
 of September 
1649.
99
 The island must have made a large impression on de La Tesserie, because he 
devoted several pages of the manuscript to its description. Prominent herein was his 
treatment of the Japanese persecution of native Christians. De La Tesserie noted that 
the emperor had barred the Portuguese from trading in the country, and had 
massacred the native Catholic community with help of the Dutch, whom he gave the 
position of preferred trading partner, previously held by the Portuguese. Other 
observations made by de La Tesserie concerned the Japanese treatment of the Dutch, 
whom they had confined to an island in the bay of Nagasaki. The Dutch were not 
allowed off the island with express permission of the Japanese governor, nor were 
they allowed to show any signs of their religious affiliation, to the extent that the 
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Japanese forced incoming ships’ crews to collect all religious representations and 
burn them.
100
  
 By the end of 1649 de La Tesserie was again on Formosa. There, he heard 
that peace had been signed between the Netherlands and Spain. To earn something of 
the new opportunities this offered, he participated in a trading expedition consisting 
of three Chinese junks to Macau (then a Habsburg holding). However, they found no 
opportunity to trade, deciding to return to Formosa. Subsequently, at the end of 
October 1650 de La Tesserie set out on a longer voyage with a Dutch trading fleet to 
Bandar Abbas (see map 2). It is unclear what de La Tesserie’s position was in this 
fleet, but it is probable that he was part of the detachment of soldiers meant for the 
protection of the ships. Traveling for nearly one and a half years, the fleet sailed to 
many of the Dutch factories in the Indian Ocean, taking on and unloading goods 
where possible. Later, two more voyages would follow to Japan.
101
  
 Apparently these voyages were very lucrative to de La Tesserie. Although 
technically forbidden, the VOC often allowed a measure of personal trading, and 
especially where those high on the hierarchy were concerned, fortunes could be 
made.
102
 This also seems to have been the case with our subject, who by 1655 
claimed to have garnered a substantial sum, probably from just such ventures.
103
 Such 
growing personal wealth was for many men the primary lure to the East, as has been 
mentioned, and for de La Tesserie also this personal fortune proved important, as we 
will see in a later chapter. 
  
                                                          
100
 de La Tesserie, ‘Mémoires’, fol. 145-147. The large amount of information proffered by de La 
Tesserie might indicate the special interest of the French foreign service in the circumstances of trade 
on Japan, which was an important potential partner. 
101
 Ibidem, 150-154. 
102
 Lequin, Het Personeel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 190-191. 
103
 de La Tesserie, ‘Mémoires’, fol. 154. 
34 
  
35 
 
Chapter 4: Deer-trade and the Chinese Revolt 
 
Having returned to fort Zeelandia from his voyage to Bandar Abbas early in 1652, de 
La Tesserie again was active in the administration of the island. The next three years 
would see him involved in increasingly important posts concerning native trade, and 
participate in the suppression of an insurrection of the Chinese farmers near Fort 
Zeelandia.  
 
4.1 Wanckan; cork in the deer-trade bottle 
 
Shortly after his return, de La Tesserie was given the command of a fortification near 
Wanckan, a fishing village populated by Chinese fishermen (see map 3).
104
 The 
village was situated north of Fort Zeelandia, holding a wachtpost called fort 
Vlissingen. The fort was there to protect the villagers against headhunters and, more 
importantly, to secure the area north of Fort Zeelandia.
105
 In 1636 the Dutch had built 
a fort on a dune in the bay, which controlled the major river running inland. It proved 
badly situated however, needing continued investments to protect it from erosion 
from seawater. The fortress was given up on the 25
th
 of January 1644, when it was 
completely dismantled.
106
 Nonetheless, a form of power projection was necessary, so 
shortly afterwards a fortified house was built on a nearby location to house a 
detachment of soldiers.  
 Next to central citadels such as fort Zeelandia, the network of fortifications 
maintained by the VOC in its various colonies also consisted of ‘groote halve 
maanen, redouten, halve maanen en buytenposte’. These were either meant to 
supplement the main citadels, of form independent but smaller posts. Although most 
citadels were meant to project maritime control, many smaller fortifications were 
constructed to maintain control over the interior. These fortifications were meant to 
resist local attackers who did not possess cannons, and were therefore placed in open 
terrain, with steep, high walls. This ensured that its garrisons could not be surprised 
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by a sudden attack, and enabled them to hold out until reinforcements could arrive.
107
 
A post such as Vlissingen did not have operate on its own, but instead performed the 
function of knot in a wider net. This net was centered on Fort Zeelandia and held 
together the lands between, while simultaneously denying entry to foreign 
competitors. 
If de La Tesserie’s statement that he was nominated as its commander is 
correct, several mentions of his activities can be found in the Dagregisters van het 
Kasteel Zeelandia. These included furnishing commissioners with escorts when they 
were visiting the local allied villages and apprehending criminals.
 
One entry was a 
request by fort Zeelandia to ‘den gebiedenden sargiant’ to provide information on 
such things as the local lime supply.
108
 However, the most important task of the 
sergeant in charge was supervising the trade in deerskins from the plains inland, 
gathering information on local trade, selling hunting licenses and apprehending 
smugglers trying to peddle those skins without paying taxes to the Dutch.
109
 These 
roles were of especially vital importance to the VOC due to the presence of Chinese 
traders and hunters in the surrounding lands.  
 
4.2 The Formosan deer hunt 
 
Most commonly noted by Europeans was the proclivity of the Formosans for hunting 
and consuming large numbers of deer. All the villages organized communal hunts, 
forming annual hunting parties which went out to hunt deer (or interloping 
neighbors). Such parties were armed with spears and bows, but primarily they relied 
on snares to trap their prey. Afterwards, the whole village was occupied with 
skinning the deer, preparing the hides for use as clothing material or sale. De La 
Tesserie himself had participated in such expeditions, where he stated that five 
hundred men were mobilized, catching over two thousand deer.
110
  
The island-wide peace instituted by the VOC opened up access to the interior 
for Chinese fortune seekers, who were eager to find new sources of animal hides for 
the perpetually short Chinese and Japanese industries. To increase output to meet 
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demand, these new Chinese interlopers introduced novel hunting practices in the 17
th
 
century, making use of large pits into which whole herds of deer were driven, to be 
speared at leisure.
111
 
Initially the Dutch were hostile to the Chinese living with the indigenous 
communities, regarding them as subversive elements, intent upon goading the local 
townspeople into overthrowing Dutch control. However, the VOC soon came to see 
the advantages which the Chinese hunters could offer to Company finances. Instead 
of controlling the deer trade directly (a practice which had been attempted but failed 
miserably, the Company decided to instead sell licenses to Chinese hunters. In an 
important work on this licensing system, Heyns signaled out four advantages thus 
obtained by the Company. The first was that their sale gave the Dutch an annual 
influx of cash. Secondly, through allowing independent Chinese to export skins on 
their own in return for ten percent tax instead of demanding all produce be sold to the 
Company, the Dutch lessened the problems of smuggling. Thirdly, the Dutch could 
buy the necessary skins for export to Japan more easily, both because the Chinese had 
increased supply and were keen on trading them to the Dutch. Lastly, local towns 
could be taxed by demanding set amounts of skins instead of cash or other goods.
112
 
 To ensure the continuation of this model, men like de La Tesserie were vital. 
The wachthuis, which lay at the nearby river inlet, ensured control over the most 
important waterway towards the northern hunting fields, and its seaboard had long 
been the joint of pirates and smugglers. Supported by the fortification and its 
garrison, officials were in a good position to screen the fields from foreign 
competition, ensuring the continued adherence of the Chinese hunters and traders to 
the licensing system instituted by the Dutch. Furthermore, as the very center from 
which the licenses for the northern regions were sold and checked, the wachthuis held 
an important regulatory position. Although its soldiers always acted under orders 
from the General Council in fort Zeelandia, its sergeant was nonetheless intimately 
involved with the system of pelt-trading which dominated the Formosan colony at the 
time.  
For de La Tesserie the position of sergeant of the wachthuis Vlissingen 
provided invaluable experience in regulating deer-skin trade and how to operate a 
military and commercial outpost removed from the main center of Company power. 
Furthermore, he would have gained first-hand knowledge of the vital importance of 
working together with the local population to attain these goals. This would have 
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included gathering knowledge on the local situation, maintaining local friendships 
and apprehending those violating the law.  
  
4.3 “Co-colonization” and divide-and-conquer 
 
After the Dutch had secured control over the native tribes, attempts were made to 
introduce modern agriculture to Formosa, so as to secure a good source of local 
foodstuffs, as well as sugar cane for sale in Europe. The local natives however were 
unreceptive to these novel agricultural techniques, forcing the Dutch to look 
elsewhere for colonists. As the number of Europeans in its service was completely 
inadequate, the Company turned to another source of farmers: Chinese from the 
coastal province of Fujian. Although Chinese merchants and hunters had been active 
on Formosa before the arrival of the VOC, actual settlement had not taken place due 
to native hostility. In a process which Andrade called ‘hybrid colonization’, Dutch 
military power secured a safe region to which Chinese farmers could migrate, 
bringing previously wild fields under cultivation. In return, the Dutch were allowed 
first rights to the produce of the fields, and levy taxes on the Chinese colonists. De La 
Tesserie mentioned that all the Chinese paid poll tax, as well as ten percent of all 
goods bartered.
113
  
 This model was so successful that by the 1650’s the overall Chinese 
population had increased to some twenty thousand individuals: VOC incomes from 
taxation were equivalent to the revenue from the deerskin-trade.
114
 The tax system 
used by the VOC however proved extremely harsh on the underprivileged Chinese 
agricultural migrants. The collection of the taxes by Company soldiers often went 
hand in hand with abuse and depredations, especially where the weaker social groups 
were concerned. Furthermore, there seemed to have been an agricultural slump the 
years just prior to the revolt which ensured further hardship with the Chinese farmers, 
who were mostly landless farmhands.
115
  
 In addition, the Chinese hunting techniques introduced to Formosa had caused 
a precipitous collapse in the animals stocks, impoverishing local villages of native 
Formosans and Chinese alike. The VOC was forced to impose strict limits on hunting 
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to give the local deer populations time to recuperate. These limitations were deeply 
resented by the Chinese hunters, further exacerbating problems between them and the 
Company.
116
  
 
4.4 The Chinese Revolt of 1652 
 
In 1652 the simmering grievances erupted into full-blown revolt. The Chinese living 
around Sakkam, the village on the other side of the bay from fort Zeelandia, rose up 
in revolt under command of one Gouqua Fay It, attacking VOC servants living in the 
surrounding area. According to de La Tesserie over fourteen thousand Chinese 
colonists joined the rebel army, although the Generale missiven van gouverneurs-
generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII gave a more conservative estimate of four 
thousand. During the night the Chinese killed and mutilated eight Dutch, cutting of 
ears and noses and carrying the heads around on bamboo sticks. Twenty-six others, 
including women and children, sought refuge in the company stables, the only 
defensible structures in the town. The Chinese quickly brought this makeshift 
position under siege, although the Dutch were able to send for help to the main 
garrison in Fort Zeelandia before they were closed off from contact.
117
  
The VOC response was swift: drawing one hundred fifty soldiers from the 
garrison, a makeshift army was sent across the bay the next morning under the 
command of a Swiss officer. Being met on the beach by the majority of Chinese 
soldiers, the detachment made an amphibious landing, breaking the untrained and 
lightly armed Chinese farmhands with concentrated volleys of musket fire. The rebels 
fled to the fields beyond the town, pursued by the victorious Dutch until nightfall. 
The commander then decided to return to the stables, wary of being ambushed by the 
still-numerous Chinese roaming the countryside. There the Dutch awaited the arrival 
of reinforcements called up by the governor from the hinterland.
118
 By this time de La 
Tesserie entered the conflict. Being at Wanckan at the time, he was ordered south, 
and to bring as many native mercenaries with him as possible from the villages in 
between.
119
 When he finally joined up with the Dutch regulars, six hundred 
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Formosans had followed de La Tesserie south.
120
 The natives were promised a bounty 
for every Chinese head they brought back, causing a manhunt in which, over the 
period of two days, five hundred Chinese were slaughtered in the surrounding fields.  
Not long afterwards the remainder of the Chinese host was found, encamped 
on a spit of land protruding into the river. Across the neck the Chinese had built a 
palisade, behind which their fighters had massed. The Dutch quickly marched 
towards the encampment, intent on stamping out the revolt permanently. Because the 
Formosans were unwilling to attack the Chinese head on, the Dutch soldiers were 
instead drawn up to break the enemy by musket volleys and charges. Several 
descriptions are in existence of the battle which followed. According to himself, de 
La Tesserie was given the command over the left wing, which consisted of fifteen 
soldiers and a sergeant, with the orders to pierce the palisade and attack the Chinese 
behind. His detachment proved successful, losing one soldier but shooting several 
volleys into the waiting Chinese in return. This gave the native mercenaries the 
confidence to attack the Chinese and rout them, hunting down the remnants for 
several days afterwards.
121
 Dapper also mentions the battle in his relation. According 
to him the Dutch had to cross a fortified hill to get to the Chinese camp. A sergeant 
was sent to capture the hill with twenty men, which he accomplished without much 
trouble. With the remainder of the Dutch following directly afterwards, the Company 
soldiers shot several volleys into the Chinese, who scattered when the Formosans 
attacked.
122
 The Generale Missiven only state that the Dutch marched up to the camp 
(the palisade having been bypassed previously), shooting four volleys into the 
Chinese before the enemy broke, only after which the local mercenaries followed in 
pursuit.
123
  
 Regardless of how the first attack was carried out (and it is well possible the 
unnamed sergeant of Dapper’s account was in fact de La Tesserie), the result was an 
utter rout for the Chinese. The Formosan auxiliaries hunted down the fugitives with a 
vengeance, killing over two thousand. Together with the dead of the prior 
engagements, more than three thousand had thus been killed in a span of only two 
weeks. It was reported to the Council of Batavia that most of the ringleaders had been 
apprehended and tortured to death at fort Zeelandia. The bloodletting quieted the 
Chinese, and was the only large scale conflict fought on the island between 1636 and 
its fall in 1662.  
                                                          
120
 Interestingly, both de La Tesserie and the Generale Missiven give the exact same number. 
121
 de La Tesserie, ‘Mémoires’, fol. 143. 
122
 Dapper, 40. 
123
 Coolhaas, Generale missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en Raden, 610. 
41 
 
4.5 A VOC career 
 
It is useful by this point to consider the experiences and skills which de La Tesserie 
had collected during his ten years in service of the VOC. By mastering Dutch and 
maintaining his Calvinist religion, he would have been a potential candidate for 
integration into the power structure. He had shown reliability (if not heroics) in 
combat, and had learnt the local language, serving as administrator and overseer in 
the Formosan countryside. Such local knowledge was invaluable to the VOC, and the 
Company was often willing to put one of its servants on the fast track to advancement 
just to retain their services. 
 Another valuable skill was de La Tesserie’s apparent capacity to act as 
navigator on the ocean going traders of the VOC; he had learnt how to navigate while 
on campaign in the Philippines.
124
 The Company did not have a central institution 
where it trained navigators, instead often recruiting them from the merchant marine in 
Europe.
125
 De La Tesserie would thus probably have learnt navigation by way of 
handbooks, which had become readily available by the middle of the 17th century, 
and by practicing with a knowledgeable skipper. By 1654, his skills in this respect 
would seem to have become substantial, as he claimed that at that point he had been 
ordered by the governor of Formosa to take over the control of the ship he was on, in 
case its current captain was incapacitated.
126
 This would also indicate that de La 
Tesserie was held in increasingly high respect by the governing bodies of the VOC, 
and which would became even clearer in the events of his final years with the 
Company.  
The above seemed to indicate that de La Tesserie indeed did have a 
cosmopolitan bend to try to incorporate dissimilarities with different groups of 
people, and learn valuable skills from many different sources. However, he was 
forced to do so because his position was that of a supplicant to the Dutch colonial 
system, and it remained to be seen if his acceptance of this new identity was anything 
more than pragmatic, and could sustain potential hardships.  
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Chapter 5: Life Choices 
 
Although de La Tesserie had become a trusted servant of the VOC, his stay was cut 
short by the type of disaster which could have a massive impact on individual lives. 
However, such changes could also open new vistas. These changes which would lead 
de La Tesserie from being a Protestant foreign soldier in the VOC on Formosa to 
becoming a French Catholic administrator with the government of Nouvelle-France 
are the subject of the following chapter.  
 
5.1 Leaving the VOC 
 
The disaster which set the train in motion leading to de La Tesserie’s eventual 
abandonment of Formosa was that of the sinking of a sea-going ship while in a 
friendly harbor. After a failed trip to de La Tesserie had decided to travel to Batavia 
instead. By the 28
th
 of October 1654 he had loaded most of his belongings on the ship 
De Vrede.
127
 Before setting out however, the captain was ordered to confer with the 
governor on loading issues. Taking a sloop with fourteen men, including de La 
Tesserie, to fort Zeelandia, the captain was therefore not present when a freak storm 
cut his ship loose from its anchors. According to the Dagregisters van het Kasteel 
Zeelandia the ship was blown on the northern reefs, where it keeled over and sank to 
the bottom. Except for two men, the entire crew was lost, as well as most of the cargo 
it carried.
128
  
The Generale Missiven state that the sinking of de Vrede and its 
accompanying ship de Witte Lam cost the Company some 94.000 florins lost in trade 
goods, as well as the death of one hundred-thirty sailors. Twenty nine members of the 
crews of both ships were saved, not including those with captain on shore.
129
 For de 
La Tesserie the blow was furthermore a personal one, as he lost most of his 
belongings, which had remained on De Vrede, including his diary and a considerable 
amount of money he had earned during his stay in the East.
130
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 Although de La Tesserie managed to retain his life by pure chance, the 
disaster nonetheless seems to have had a large effect on his mindset. By 1655 his star 
had seemed on the rise, and with some luck de La Tesserie could have expected 
further promotion. He might however have taken issue with the slow rate of 
advancement which would have been his part as well. Conversely, if de La Tesserie’s 
account was biased to show his career as more positive than it actually was, exactly 
the fact that he was not making promotion might have caused him to contemplate 
returning to France, much as de Chambelle had done four years prior.
131
 Regardless, 
the loss of his fortune apparently decided the dilemma for de La Tesserie. It must not 
be forgotten that he was twenty-five at the time, and a certain youthful impetuousness 
might in the end have overridden more levelheaded choices.  
Thus de La Tesserie decided he had had enough of the East, wanting to return 
to France to see ‘quelle fortune il y avoit a faire’.132 He quickly embarked for 
Batavia, where he found a berth on a returning ship. The fleet left somewhere in 
February 1655. After an uneventful voyage, passing the recently built VOC fortress at 
the Cape of the Good Hope and St. Helena, the fleet arrived at Amsterdam in May.
133
 
There, the men were ordered to mark their belongings, and disembark without their 
luggage. Subsequently, the directors of the VOC had the luggage carried off to their 
warehouses. There they were checked for contraband, for returning sailors were not 
allowed to possess trade goods with a total worth higher than two months’ wage. 
Four days after disembarking, the sailors were allowed to pick up their baggage and 
collect their wages before they could return to their place of origin.
134
  
 Upon disembarkment the Company habitually stressed the fact that its 
employees were barred from sharing any information such as trade routes, 
fortifications and garrison sizes, with third parties. Servants were not allowed to write 
about the Company’s operations in the east, nor were they allowed to join a rival 
trade company, for fear that thereby important information would fall in the hands of 
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competitors.
135
 However, such rules were honored largely in the breach, and it was 
often through men knowledgeable in the activities of the Company that information 
passed to others, as we will see in the penultimate chapter. 
 
5.2 De La Tesserie in France 
 
Having return to France, it is unlikely that de La Tesserie faced destitution due to his 
financial losses in Asia. Before leaving for the East, probably with the likelihood of 
death in mind, he had already bequeathed his elder brother a sum of eight thousand 
livres, to be reimbursed upon his return. Furthermore, he was also still in possession 
of the lands inherited from his mother’s father.136 These belongings would have put 
him in the position of some affluence. Furthermore, de La Tesserie might have 
looked forward to acquiring a prestigious position in the local governance, much as 
other members of his family had earlier possessed.
137
 
 However, the situation for Huguenot nobles was less than rosy in the France 
of the middle 17
th
 century. As Louis XIV gained more control over the apparatus of 
state, discrimination of Huguenots had intensified. Preserving a Huguenot identity 
and at the same time maintaining a successful career within the French state thus was 
increasingly difficult, as restrictions were put on which professions could be carried 
out by Huguenots, and their access to the central state apparatus and its lucrative 
occupations became more restrictive also.
138
  
 Because of the peculiar relation which the Huguenots had with the Edict of 
Nantes, and the link between its legitimacy and the power of the Crown, a crisis of 
loyalty arose. As Redlich has shown in his work on mercenary captains in the Thirty 
Years war, many Catholics served with the Protestant side, and vice versa. Although 
a number did so out of pragmatic opportunism, many others served their lord, even if 
he was of the wrong religion, because they still viewed him as their legal ruler. 
Loyalty to the apparatus, embodied in the overlord’s office of state, and the place of 
the mercenary within it, often superseded the demands of confession or family. The 
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decision to cross the confessional divide therefore was to a large extent a loyalty 
dilemma, and it was one many men had large difficulties making.
139
 
 Such a crisis of loyalty might also have influenced de La Tesserie’s actions. In 
his own report he stated that Protestantism was the belief he used to follow when 
working for the VOC, and we have seen that his family was of old Huguenot stock.
140
 
Somewhere between his return from Asia and 1666 he converted to Catholicism. 
Most likely is that this event happened before 1661, for reasons we shall discuss 
shortly. During the 17
th
 century, such conversions were not uncommon. Especially 
the northern Huguenot congregations, due to their small size and aristocratic makeup, 
proved more prone to social pressures, suffering large-scale reduction.
141
 
Interestingly, many of Louis XIV’s earlier state servants were converted Huguenots, 
especially where the army was concerned. The social stigma of being a Protestant 
seemed to have been easily expugnable by converting.  
 It is quite possible that de La Tesserie’s time in the VOC was what swayed 
him to renounce his Huguenot background. As we have seen in chapter two, the 
VOC, through its policies of discrimination, often came to throw together its servants 
into groups drawn along ethnical lines. As such men gathered, both for their own 
security and for the mutual support, these ties might have been reinforced to the point 
that a sort of group identity was formed, strongly based on their ethnical background. 
It was (and is) not uncommon for expatriate communities to band together and 
reinforce their intergroup ties by stressing their commonalities of language and 
background.  
 Such a move can be clearly seen in travel accounts of Frenchmen in the East 
in general. The description of the actions of other Europeans in the East rivaled those 
of Oriental peoples in breadth: French travelers clearly saw the European groups as 
clearly distinct from each other. This was especially the case with the Dutch and 
Portuguese, to whom the French often attributed great cruelty, but of whom they were 
at the same time envious of the power they had accrued. At the same time, these 
travelers were quick to write down the stories of their French compatriots, be they in 
the service of one of the companies or independently employed. It is clear that many 
French envisioned their compatriots as belonging to the same group, distinct from 
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other Europeans.
142
 When de La Tesserie returned to France in 1655, he might 
therefore have gravitated more towards his French identity then to his Huguenot one. 
As part of being a good Frenchman had increasingly become equated with being a 
Catholic loyal to the Crown, conversion might thus have been not only pragmatic, but 
logical as well.
143
 
 
5.3 Leaving France for a second time 
 
Owning to his particular skill-set, de La Tesserie probably had little difficulty looking 
for opportunities abroad. Such an occasion presented itself when the French Crown 
ordered a new governor, named Du Bois d’Avaugour, to its colony of Nouvelle-
France, with the intention of setting Crown affairs there in order.
144
 As with most 
early modern governors, d’Avaugour would have wanted to ship out to his new post 
with a following including men acquainted with the tasks at hand. Before leaving, 
d’Avaugour must therefore have considered finding just such men to fill the 
necessary positions. It is here that de La Tesserie could be of service.  
The manner in which de La Tesserie met d’Avaugour remains unknown, but 
some points of speculation could prove insightful. Both men came from Brittany, and 
as a member of a cadet-branch of the old dukes of Brittany, d’Avaugour most 
certainly resided in the vicinity of Nantes. One-time capital of the duchy and most 
important seat of the ducal house, the city was the paramount administrative center of 
the French province. D’Avaugour might easily have met de La Tesserie there during 
one of his stays. Furthermore, both men had fought in the Thirty Years War, although 
while de La Tesserie fought as mercenary for the Dutch, d’Avaugour, who was 
probably twenty years his senior, had had a distinguished career in the French 
cavalry, and later as liaison to the Swedish in Germany. D’Avaugour also held 
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several positions in the French government, before being nominated as new governor 
of Nouvelle-France on the recommendations of the queen of France.
145
 
Another possible link between de La Tesserie and Nouvelle-France were his 
family connections in La Rochelle. The Huguenot merchants of the city had long 
been important in the colonization efforts of the American continent, and many of its 
early explorers and settlers had been funded by Huguenots, or had been Huguenots 
themselves. Even though by 1627 only Catholics were allowed to travel and settle in 
the colonies, this did not stop the merchant class of La Rochelle and elsewhere to 
continue trading with partners there. It is thus well possible that de La Tesserie was 
informed of the job vacancy by a relative, or conversely that d’Avaugour was notified 
of just such a man fulfilling his requirements when informing in La Rochelle. 
The question might be raised as to why de La Tesserie would choose to ship 
out to another far-away place, when having returned from a perilous one just some 
years prior. The most important reason was no doubt that de La Tesserie still was a 
young man by 1661. Only thirty-two, he would still have half his life before him. The 
knowledge that he might otherwise only remain the second son of a member of the 
lower nobility, and a religious minority in a country which was becoming 
increasingly repressive to boot, might have outweighed any fears of the dangerous 
and unknown. 
Furthermore, by conversion to Catholicism de La Tesserie opened some 
doors, but closed others. By 1656 de La Tesserie had granted his elder brother 
Gabriel the rights to his part of the family patrimony, thereby losing his rights to the 
noble title conferred by these estates.
146
 Furthermore, while de La Tesserie turned 
Catholic, his family seems to have remained staunchly Huguenot.
147
 His brother and 
his wife fled France during the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, and two of 
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his nieces were apprehended when trying to board a ship to join their parents in 
exile.
148
 Although this did not necessarily mean that de La Tesserie’s ties with his 
family had been broken, his conversion and loss of patrimonial rights could weaken 
them sufficiently for him to contemplate leaving again.
149
  
 This episode in de La Tesserie’s life seemed to both belie and affirm his 
cosmopolitanism. Although apparently integrated into the Dutch colonial system, de 
La Tesserie chose to forego whatever advancement he had made there after one 
particular disaster. Instead, he returned to his native country of France, and joined a 
wholly French institution. This seemed to indicate dissatisfaction with his position in 
the Dutch Company, and a possible yearning to return home. However, it must be 
remembered that de La Tesserie had returned to a France in which his own people, 
the Huguenots, were being increasingly repressed. Instead of leaving for more 
tolerant destinations, as many of his co-religionists did, de La Tesserie chose to 
convert to Catholicism and take on the guise of a French bureaucrat. Furthermore, he 
again chose to leave for a frontier region, in which large numbers of Europeans had to 
contend with large groups of indigenes. To an extent it thus seems that de La Tesserie 
was not only comfortable in changing his public appearance for his own convenience, 
but also was very much drawn to the regions in which European culture was in 
contact with others. Even if his interest in those of other cultures might be no more 
than a pragmatic method of inserting himself into said society, it was undeniable 
present in his actions, as we will see further down the line. 
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Chapter 6: Lieutenant of d’Avaugour and early service in 
Nouvelle-France 
 
Although the manner in which de La Tesserie met d’Avaugour, and the date of his 
conversion, will remain the subject of speculation, the sources are clear that he left 
France as part of the retinue of the newly appointed governor.
150
 His skills learnt 
while serving the VOC would have prepared him perfectly for the job at hand in 
Nouvelle-France. As lieutenant of d’Avaugour, de La Tesserie would have played an 
important part in the governor’s extensive plans for revitalizing the fledgling colony. 
This chapter will discuss the problems faced by the French colony, the changes 
D’Avaugour hoped to introduce, and de La Tesserie’s role therein.  
 
6.1 The colony of Nouvelle-France 
 
The colony of Nouvelle-France had its origins in the early voyages of discovery by 
Jacques Cartier, who first reached what would become Quebec City in 1534. In a 
later voyage he also sailed up the St. Laurent River, which would become the central 
highway of the future colony. During these voyages Cartier met and traded with the 
native Indians, finding a ready source of beaver skins, which were highly valued 
commodities in Europe at the time. A first attempt to found a colony in 1542 failed, 
however, and renewed warfare with the Habsburg Empire and the later religious strife 
stopped any further attempts at settlement by the Crown.
151
 
 Nonetheless, French merchants continued travelling to the mouth of the St. 
Lawrence River, drawn by the profits to be made in the pelt-trade. An annual market 
developed at the village of Tadoussac where Indians from the northern lands gathered 
to sell their wares to the French in return for iron tools and other amenities from 
Europe. By the late 16
th
 century this trade had become so lucrative that the French 
Crown, having secured peace at home, considered a renewed attempt at founding a 
colony and secure the northern pelt-trade. In 1603 a royal monopoly on the trade was 
granted to a consortium of French merchants, who were obliged to found a settlement 
which could serve as an entrepôt for the fur-trade, and staff it with a number of 
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settlers. A first colony was built on the Atlantic seaboard of Acadia, but it was soon 
shifted to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, where modern-day Quebec now 
lies.
152
  
 To secure the supply of furs, the French colonists aligned themselves with the 
Hurons who inhabited the valley of the St. Lawrence. This alliance was cemented by 
the arrival of several Catholic missionaries in 1614, who soon made converts among 
the Huron tribe, and extended French contacts and diplomatic power ever further 
west. Through the decades, the power of the clergy grew to such an extent that they 
became major players in colonial politics. The high point of clerical power was 
during the tenure of the bishop de Laval (1658-1688), who had one unwelcome 
governor removed, and secured the appointment of another.
153
  
Regardless of the influence of the clergy, the colony struggled through the 
first years of its existence. By 1627 the cardinal de Richelieu reformed the fur trade 
monopoly, which had proven ineffective. A new company was formed, the 
Compagnie de la Nouvelle France, with the express order of settling the surrounding 
lands so as to make the colony self-sufficient, and convert the local Indians, turning 
them into proper Frenchmen. The CNF was also to oversee the fur-trade, and ensure 
that the Crown could enjoy the profits of its colony.
154
  
 In the subsequent years the French colonists were able to press inland along 
the St. Lawrence River, founding the towns of Trois-Rivières and Montreal. 
However, Nouvelle-France continued to be dogged by problems. The CNF was 
unable to bring in the required numbers of settlers, nor was it able to control the local 
fur-trade. Increasingly, to defray the costs made in maintaining the colony, the CNF 
subcontracted its monopoly to consortiums of local merchants in return for a yearly 
tithe of a thousand beaver pelts. Ironically, the consortiums themselves proved 
ineffective. Independent traders travelled inland to buy the pelts more cheaply at the 
source. By the 1650’s these men had coalesced into a distinct group known as the 
coureurs de bois. Going to the sources of pelt-production proved much more 
effective than relying on the Indian tribes to bring the pelts to the market.
155
  
 The French traders also had competition from the Dutch colony of New 
Netherland, which traded with the Iroquois from their post at Albany on the Hudson 
River. This trade had become of such importance to the latter that in 1642 they 
invaded the lands of the Huron tribes in search for more pelts. By 1649 the Iroquois 
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had destroyed the Hurons, cutting off the French from their immediate trade network 
and taking control of the pelt trade routes to both Albany and Quebec. Their primary 
goal achieved, the Iroquois made peace with the French in 1653. However, actual 
control continued to elude the Iroquois, as other tribes stepped into the vacuum left 
by the Hurons. By 1658, the Iroquois again commenced raiding the French 
settlements. The colonial towns came under what amounted to a siege by Indian war 
parties, making cultivation of the surrounding fields nearly impossible and causing 
the small French colony to be unable to secure large enough quantities of pelts for 
export to France.
156
  
 
6.2 D’Avaugour and the stabilization of the colony 
 
It was the problems of external aggression and low profit from the fur trade which 
d’Avaugour thus needed to resolve. By the end of August 1661 the new governor and 
his retinue, including de La Tesserie, had arrived at Quebec (see map 4). There, an 
inspection was carried out of the fortifications, settlements and potential possibilities 
for the expansion of trade.
157
 The findings have been saved in the form of two 
memoranda sent to Colbert, the French minister of finances. In both memoranda the 
governor mentioned the great fertility of the St. Lawrence valley, but also stated that 
it could never be sufficiently cultivated as long as the threat of Iroquois incursions 
remained present. D’Avaugour believed that attacking the Iroquois directly was 
impossible, due to the long distances involved in campaigning. Only if the Dutch near 
Fort Orange (the main fortification at Albany) could be convinced to give the French 
safe passage would such a solution be feasible, but he thought this unlikely.
158
  
The solution proposed by the new governor was to fortify the three main 
settlements thoroughly, as well as build fortifications on the chokepoints leading into 
the valley. Giving precise descriptions of what type of fortifications to build and 
where they were to be built, d’Avaugour also called for an expansion of the present 
forces in the colony to garrison these new positions.
159
 It is credible to think that de 
La Tesserie, with his background both in fortifications and in the governance of such 
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vital points of trade, would have had a hand in the formation of these plans. Even if 
de La Tesserie was not involved in the drawing up of the plans, he was clearly a firm 
supporter. In his first letter to du Fresnes de La Tesserie emphatically stated that the 
only thing which could be done to counter Indian incursions was to fortify the borders 
and threaten the native heartlands.
160
 
 D’Avaugour would also adjust the economic underpinning of the colony. The 
CNF had proven unable to carry the costs of maintaining the colony, let alone paying 
for the proposed building of the new fortifications or the expansion of the garrison. 
This had left it deep in debt. To alleviate the concerns of the CNF’s creditors, in 1662 
the governor promised them ten percent of the sale of animal skins in the coming 
year. In a further move, on the 4
th
 of March 1663 the CNF was ordered to hand over 
its taxation rights to a group of local merchants. In return for the right to tax all skins 
being exported, as well as the sole right to trade with the Indians of Tadoussac, the 
new consortium of influential Quebecois were obliged to pay the colonial 
government a tithe of fifty thousand livres, deemed sufficient to meet the costs of the 
colony.
161
 One of these men was de La Tesserie, and it is clear from this appointment 
that he had risen to the top of colonial society.  
 
6.3 The comparison of de La Tesserie’s role in the colonies of Formosa and 
Nouvelle-France 
 
At this point it is interesting to note the similarities between de La Tesserie’s 
occupation in the Dutch colony of Formosa, and the French colony of Nouvelle-
France, which would have stood him in good stead in gaining the position as 
lieutenant of d´Avaugour. Much like the Dutch colony on Formosa, the French in 
Canada had been drawn to the area for the great riches its nascent pelt-trade could 
bring. Similar to the Dutch, the French also had difficulty controlling the trade which, 
although nominally a monopoly, actually increasingly came into the hands of 
independent traders and native tribes. Interestingly, in a direct reference to their 
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contemporary French counterparts, Andrade calls the early Chinese hunters on 
Formosa the equivalent to the coureurs de bois.
162
  
 As the costs of maintaining the monopoly skyrocketed for the respective 
companies, both also turned to other methods for making a profit. The Dutch were 
quick to grant out hunting licenses instead, obliging the Chinese independent hunters 
to buy them at annual fairs, while securing their own share of skins for the export to 
Japan through levying a certain share as taxes from the native tribes. The French 
mirrored these actions, especially in the case of the abolishment of the CNF, and the 
grant of its monopoly to de La Tesserie and his compatriots in return for a tax. To de 
La Tesserie, such subletting of the monopoly to independent traders would have been 
very similar indeed to the practices he had encountered in the East.  
 Another similarity would have been the use of fortifications to choke off the 
routes of trade from the interior fields to the markets abroad while protecting the 
areas vital to the company’s interests. Much like the Formosan tribes, the Native 
Americans did not have the knowhow to take such fortifications by military means, 
making such positions nearly impervious to outside aggression. We have seen that the 
Dutch had shielded off the lucrative Formosan hunting grounds with fortifications 
such as the author´s previous post Wanckan, and it is clear from the above 
memorandums that d´Avaugour was planning something similar.  
The manner of warfare of the Indians would have looked similar to those of 
the Formosan headhunters. Pierre Boucher, a contemporary of de La Tesserie who 
also lived in Canada, described how the Indians fought with clubs, bows and arrows, 
preferring to ambush their adversaries. If the Indians saw that the enemy was too 
powerful, they retreated immediately. Although they were vigorous in attack, the 
Indians did not have a resistance against extended exertion, and fled when they met 
significant resistance. This trait, as we have seen, was also mentioned by de La 
Tesserie when he described the unwillingness of the Formosan allies to attack the 
Chinese, until the Dutch soldiers had broken their ranks.
163
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 A final similarity would have been the role of the clergy in mediating between 
the colony and the native inhabitants. Both on Formosa and in Canada religious men 
had formed the forefront of colonial expansion. Much as was the case with the native 
villages of the Siraya in Formosa, the French had aligned themselves with the Hurons 
primarily through the efforts of the preachers. When their new allies, and incidentally 
their most important source of pelts, came under attack, the French were obliged to 
join in the war with the Iroquois, with detrimental effect to the young colony.
164
  
 The clergy were also instrumental in the interactions between the colonial 
governments, both in Formosa and Nouvelle-France, and the surrounding tribes. 
Because they were often the ones who spoke the local language best, it was the clergy 
who formed the main layer between the government and the Indians. As the 
Europeans tried to extend their laws to the surrounding tribes, it was up to the local 
missionaries to translate and incorporate those into native culture. However, the 
clergy also tried to protect the natives from the depredations of the colonial power. In 
a comparison of the interactions between the Dutch and their native subjects on 
Formosa and New Netherlands, Hauptmann and Knapp saw major similarities in the 
efforts of the missionaries in both colonies to defend the indigenous tribes from the 
colonial government. These actions proved ineffective however, largely because of 
the small numbers and political weakness of the missionaries in these areas.
165
 In the 
case of Nouvelle-France, where the clergy was much more powerful, these efforts 
would instead lead to a rift between the secular and religious administrations, which 
in the end would force de La Tesserie to seriously rethink his future in North 
America. 
 It is clear that the skills which de La Tesserie had learnt during the first phases 
of his cosmopolitan career were a great help in his endeavors in Nouvelle-France. 
Even if they were not the direct cause of him landing the position of lieutenant to 
d’Avaugour in the first place, de La Tesserie’s experience proved highly suitable to 
the conditions he encountered in Nouvelle-France, and were probably the main 
reason for his quick rise to the top of the colonial bureaucracy. 
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Chapter 7: Deteriorating circumstances 
 
By 1663, the power struggle between the secular administration and the clergy, which 
had simmered on for decades in the colony, finally came to a head. A dispute 
between the bishop of Quebec and governor d’Avaugour over the liquor trade led to 
the latter’s recall, auguring in a period during which the governance of the colony 
was in flux. This chapter will discuss these troubles, and the effects they had on de La 
Tesserie’s continued willingness to remain in Nouvelle France.  
 
7.1 The recall of d’Avaugour 
 
The administration of d’Avaugour had had a vigorous start, actively taking stock of 
the state of the colony and drawing up a comprehensive plan for the solution of its 
problems. Several measures towards this plan have already been discussed in the 
prior chapter, but they formed only part of the reforms carried out. The attempts of 
the governor to change the government of the province proved a more complicated 
proposition.  
Since 1647 the colony had possessed a Sovereign Council, which held a wide 
remit over the disbursement of public funds, the regulation of the police, the right to 
grant or refuse to governmental posts, to borrow money, and to appoint the captains 
of the local militias. Furthermore, it was the highest judicial court in the region, with 
only the king’s court as the final court of appeal. The Council consisted of the 
governor, the superior of the Jesuits and two councilors chosen by the governor. 
Furthermore, a colonial representative (or syndic) of each of the three cities was 
chosen to support the councilors in their work. A year later these men became 
permanent members of the council.
166
 
 In principle the power of the governor was balanced through his association 
with the clergy and colonial representatives, but his powers were ill-defined. 
Successive governors used the opportunity this offered to assemble powers in their 
own office, to the increasing ire of the remainder of the Council. By the time of 
d’Avaugour, the Council was unwilling to grant him their approval for the attempted 
reforms, both because they had interests in the old system, and because they feared a 
further increase of his power.  
 Due to this obstinacy the governor was forced to side-step the appointed 
Council altogether, by promulgating his decrees unilaterally. D’Avaugour’s military 
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disposition and personality no doubt also had a role in his increasing propensity to 
autocratic rule, as many contemporaries noted his military mindset, inability to 
compromise and lack of social graces. The court of Louis XIV quickly became 
inundated in reports of his supposed high-handed and despotic rule, as well as 
numerous calls for his removal.
167
 
The spark which set events in motions was a dispute with the local clergy over 
the liquor trade. The clergy feared that the easy access to liquor would encourage 
drunkenness, blasphemous behavior and high death rates with the indigenous 
population, and set back the work of conversion being done. Headed by the 
headstrong apostolic vicar Francois de Laval the clergy had excommunicated all 
those who traded in the trade in 1660, and pushed for the promulgation of laws which 
would forbid the sale of liquor to the Indians on the pain of death.
168
  
 In first instance the new governor agreed with de Laval, making the decree 
into law and executing several offenders. However, when a woman was similarly 
accused, the Jesuits disallowed her execution. D’Avaugour did not want to carry out 
arbitrary judgment and instead reacted by opening the brandy-trade to all. De Laval 
subsequently extended the excommunication to all those who were in any way 
involved in the liquor trade. He also decided to travel to France in 1662 to convince 
the king of the governor’s high-handedness in judicial matters. De Laval was able to 
secure d’Avaugour’s removal, the second governor he treated thusly. He also 
obtained the right, together with a newly appointed governor, Augustin de Saffray de 
Mézy, to choose the members for a new Sovereign Council, which would become the 
highest political body in the colony. At this point it was clear that the clergy had 
become the most powerful party in the colony.
169
 
 
7.2 The high point 
 
The role of de La Tesserie in the political troubles was a minor one, but it can be 
assumed he was a firm supporter of d’Avaugour. For his services, d’Avaugour 
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granted de La Tesserie a sub-fief on the Ile d’Orléans, together with the sieur de 
Máze (see map 5). De Mazé had been the secretary of d’Avaugour, and was later 
named the commander of the garrison of Quebec. Both men had arrived in the colony 
on the same ship, and seemed to have been fast friends, as in 1665 de Máze would 
bequeath his part of the fief to de La Tesserie before leaving for France.
170
 This sub-
fief became known as la Grossardière, a name derived from the old estates which the 
Cailhauts had held in France, and firmly cemented de La Tesserie as an important 
landholder in his own right in the new colony.  
The confidence of d’Avaugour in his lieutenant became further apparent when 
the latter caught a rumor of his impending dismissal. D’Avaugour left for France 
before the arrival of his replacement on the 23
rd
 of July 1663, transferring his 
authority to de La Tesserie in the interim.
171
 With both Laval and d’Avaugour now in 
or on their way to France, de La Tesserie had now gained the most powerful position 
in colony of New France. His powers as interim-governor were nonetheless 
circumscribed by the transient nature of his position. Because de La Tesserie could be 
certain of the imminent arrival of d’Avaugour’s replacement, and because the 
Council itself was largely populated by men loyal to Laval, there would have been 
little room for independent action.  
He was however able to push through several pieces of legislation before 
Laval and de Mézy came to relieve him from his duty. The Council passed a law 
which demanded from French merchants selling goods in the colony a tax of sixty-
five percent. This was largely done by the Council to ensure a secure source of 
income for the colony. In January 1664 the merchants involved placed a complaint 
with the Council that they had not been informed of these new laws, and would 
therefore be unable to sell their goods for enough profit. The Council upheld the 
decision made by de La Tesserie, although it did allow the merchants involved to sell 
their current goods at a higher rate.
172
  
In all, de La Tesserie’s imprint on the politics of Quebec during his tenure as 
interim governor do not seem to have left much of a mark, but it is significant that he 
attempted to gain secure sources of finance for the governance of the province in 
much the same way as the VOC did in its eastern belongings. 
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7.3 Marriage 
 
Another important event in this period was de La Tesserie’s betrothal and marriage to 
Éléonore de Grandmaison on the 10
th
 of October 1663.
173
 De Grandmaison, born in 
1619 in Nivernais, had been a fixture of Canadian society for the last twenty-two 
years, having arrived in the colony in 1641. Widowed for the first time in France, she 
had travelled to Nouvelle-France with her second husband, François de Chavigny de 
Berchereau. De Chavigny had been a supporter of governor de Montmagny, who 
appointed him to the position of interim-governor when he left for France in 1648 (an 
apparent precursor to the relationship between d’Avaugour and de La Tesserie fifteen 
years later). He was also appointed to the first iteration of the Sovereign Council that 
same year. The couple had been granted lands near Quebec, and a seigneurie near 
Trois-Rivières. To these were added in 1649 a seigneurie on the Ile d’Orleans, which 
abutted the lands later granted to de La Tesserie.  
De Chavigny died in 1651, leaving de Grandmaison with six children and a 
large amount of property. In 1652 she remarried to Jacques Gourdeau de Beaulieu, a 
clerk and notary to the court, and part of the consortium which had been granted the 
fur-monopoly by d’Avaugour. With De Beaulieu she begot three more children. Her 
third husband was however murdered in May 1663, also leaving his belongings to his 
wife.
174
 
De Grandmaison proved to be a savvy manager of her inherited estates. She 
became the administrator of the lands of her husbands in name of her children, even 
marrying de La Tesserie, her fourth husband, with division of property, a highly 
uncommon move at the time. As her children came of age, de Grandmaison took care 
to give them a large dowry (in the case of his stepdaughters), or lands consisting of 
different combinations of the estates under her care. She thereby ensured that her 
children were able to marry in the top tiers of Canadian society.
175
 
For de La Tesserie this marriage was highly advantageous. De Grandmaison 
possessed extensive lands in the colony and was an important player in its internal 
politics, even disregarding the connections which her erstwhile husbands would have 
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had.
176
 Other connections could also be created through the marriage of his 
stepchildren to colonial partners. It is clear that de La Tesserie supported such 
advantageous marriages, as he gave two of his stepdaughters a dowry of one thousand 
livres, a considerable sum at the time.
177
 Even though de Grandmaison was past her 
childbearing age, she would thus have been able to give her new husband invaluable 
help in navigating the politics and economics of his new home.  
 
7.4 The governorship of de Mézy 
 
For all intents and purposes, de La Tesserie’s honeymoon in the bosom of colonial 
power did not last long. On the 17
th
 of September 1663 de Mézy and de Laval 
disembarked at Quebec. Upon arrival, a series of reforms were pushed through. 
Firstly, the CNF was abolished, and the monopoly reverted to the crown. Shortly 
afterwards the Compagnie de l’Occident was created to replace it, with the intent of 
competing with the Dutch and English in the America’s.178 For de La Tesserie the 
new company meant the loss of the lucrative concessions in the pelt-trade made to 
him and his compatriots by d’Avaugour, as the actions of d’Avaugour was ruled 
unconstitutional by de Mézy on the 2
nd
 of October 1663.
179
 
 Even worse in this regard was the restructuring of the Sovereign Council. De 
Laval and de Mézy dismissed all the Councilors of its previous incarnation, including 
de La Tesserie. The new Council now consisted of the governor, the bishop, and five 
councilors to be chosen by both the governor and the bishop. The reorganization 
curtailed the power of the governor, as a majority was necessary for voting, and his 
vote was only worth one of seven. It also weakened the power of the local colonists, 
as the syndics were banned from the Council altogether. Because the new governor 
did not have knowledge of those who might be eligible, this in practice meant that de 
Laval had control over the nominations. The bishop duly made use of this power by 
staffing the Council with his own supporters.
180
 De La Tesserie, although without 
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doubt an experienced administrator, was passed over, probably due to his strong 
connection with the party of d’Avaugour.  
 These appointments looked as if they would permanently bar access to the 
highest rungs of the political ladder for de La Tesserie, but renewed conflict between 
the secular and religious officials again offered opportunity. De Mézy had initially 
been chosen by de Laval because of his piousness. The new governor had been born 
in the Norman Huguenot nobility, but converted to Catholicism during his tenure as 
mayor of Caen. He quickly became known for the zeal with which he pursued his 
faith.
181
 It is interesting to see here another case of a former Huguenot being able to 
obtain good positions within the French government: as long as their conversion 
seemed to be genuine, men like de La Tesserie and de Mézy could be easily accepted 
into the ranks of the French government.  
 In any event, de Laval’s hope that de Mézy would respect the religious 
primacy of the clergy in the province proved a miscalculation. De Mézy quickly 
undertook to weaken the power of the Council in turn. In a series of moves both de 
Laval and de Mézy jostled for power in the colony. In the 19
th
 of September 1664 de 
Mézy eventually dismissed four of the five Councilors because of their lack obstinacy 
and support for de Laval. Although two of these Councilors were quickly reinstated, 
the two remaining seats were filled by new men. One of those was the sieur de Mazé, 
whom we met earlier, and another was de La Tesserie himself.
182
  
 It seems that at this point de Mézy had aligned himself with the old following 
of d’Avaugour. By appointing both men to the position of Councilor de Mézy hoped 
to counter the power of de Laval in the Sovereign Council. The measure was a clear 
success, as de Laval and his followers were henceforth restricted to denouncing the 
governor from the pulpits. An uneasy truce followed between the supporters of de 
Laval and de Mézy, punctuated by hostile sermons and plaques by both parties. The 
deadlock was only broken when the latter died suddenly on March 1665. However, 
by then the Crown had already decided on reforming the colonial government once 
again.
183
  
 
7.5 The arrival of governor-general de Tracy and intendant Talon 
 
While political unrest continued to simmer in New France, the French government 
under leadership of Colbert was drawing up new plans for its colonial holdings. As 
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mentioned earlier, the CO was formed in 1664 with control over all crown lands in 
the west. It was modeled on the Dutch and English West India Companies, including 
funding by shareholders and the appointment of a governor-general to act as viceroy 
and oversee all activities in the Americas. The man chosen for this position was the 
sieur de Tracy, who had set sail for the Caribbean in February 1664, before making 
his way to Nouvelle-France, arriving on the 30
th
 of June, 1665.
184
  
 To carry out his orders de Tracy was given accompanied by a regiment of 
soldiers with whom he was to cow the Indians into submission, fortify the colony, 
and settle those soldiers who were willing on new lands to the south of Montreal, 
creating a shield for the lands along the St. Lawrence river. With him was also an 
intendant, named Jean Talon, who had orders to reinvigorate the economy and make 
the colony again a profitable part of the French crown.
185
  
 Before setting out for the Iroquois heartlands, de Tracy reorganized the 
Sovereign Council, as it would prove a final time. De Laval was deprived the right to 
appoint new Councilmembers, now the purview of the intendant, who had been 
newly added to the Council to oversee its proceeding in name of the King. This 
measure permanently weakened the hold of the bishop on the Council, and that of the 
clergy on the colony in general. However, the Council as composed by de Mézy was 
also turned back to its prior state, which meant that de Máze and de Le Tesserie were 
dismissed.
186
 
 The first expedition mounted by Daniel de Rémy de Courcelle, who was 
officially the governor of New France and de facto commander of its armed forces, 
proved a failure. De Courcelle took six hundred men (possibly including de La 
Tesserie) south to subjugate the Iroquois, but neglected bringing local guides. This 
caused many detours, slowing down the march significantly. When the troops were 
surprised by a sudden snowstorm, they were forced to make for Fort Orange. 
According to de La Tesserie the soldiers were surprised there by several hundred 
Iroquois, after which a skirmish ensued. Although the fighting was inconclusive, the 
French were forced to retreat back to Nouvelle France, marking an end to the first 
expedition against the Iroquois. During the retreat over forty men were lost to cold or 
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disease.
187
 Suffice to say that by the time of writing his memoires, the security of the 
colony inhabited by de La Tesserie still seemed far from secure.  
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Chapter 8: A new beginning 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the memoires de La Tesserie wrote were an attempt 
to have du Fresnes gain him a position with a company which would have seemed 
very familiar with him due to his prior occupation; the Compagnie des Indes 
Orientales. It is to the founding of this company and de La Tesserie’s reasons for 
joining it that we will turn next. 
  
8.1 The founding of the CFIO 
 
Before we can go into the reasons of the choice made by de La Tesserie, we first have 
to describe the background of the French East India Company he was hoping to join. 
Much like the restructuring of Nouvelle-France and the creation of the CO, the 
founding of the CFIO was the brainchild of the French minister of finances, Jean-
Baptise Colbert. Colbert had become uncomfortably aware of the great riches which 
the VOC brought to the Netherlands, and the relative weakness of France in this 
respect. By creating a French adversary to the VOC, he hoped to claim a part of the 
lucrative Indian Ocean trade for the Crown of France.
188
 
Although the CFIO was to be a competitor of the VOC, it was closely 
modeled on the successful Dutch company. Knowledge of the workings of the 
Company was widespread in France itself, and calls had gone op since the early 17
th
 
century to create a French version and reap the wealth of the East. However, it was 
not until the 1660’s that such calls could be changed from a theoretic model into 
practice. Louis XIV’s thirst for gloire and Colbert’s belief in the necessity of securing 
those trades vital to France’s economic health ensured that political pressure could be 
brought to bear to secure the cooperation of the nobles and the merchants, i.e. those 
with money and those with the trading acumen.
189
 
In 1664, several precursor companies were merged to form the basis of the 
new company. Central control was vested with an Assemblée générale consisting of 
twenty-one directors, with its headquarters in Paris. Twelve of these directors were 
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from Paris, and one each from the major coastal trading cities. The finances of this 
new Compagnie would also be mirrored on those of the VOC. Colbert called for 
nobles and merchants to buy shares in the market, in the expectation of financial 
return later. In this drive for finances, the crown led the way. The CFIO quickly 
secured over 6,500,000 livres to fund its first expedition. Half this sum was paid by 
the crown, with the other half being funded by private investors.
190
 However, these 
shareholders paid only grudgingly and after the initial investment few were willing to 
continue investing in the venture. Nearly by default, this meant that the Crown 
became the major stockholder of the Compagnie, and would dominate the 
appointment of officials and its decision-making process henceforth. This is also the 
reason why de La Tesserie thought that an appeal to the minister of foreign affairs 
would have any chance of success.  
By 1665 Colbert had set up the groundwork for his new company. Next a 
comprehensive plan of action needed to be formed, and information on the East 
needed to be gathered. It is in this vain that Du Fresnes had written to de La Tesserie 
for an account of his own experiences in the east. Another informant was Francois 
Caron whom we have met earlier. Caron had been expelled from the service of the 
VOC in 1651 on the basis of allegations of corruption and favoritism. When Colbert 
was planning the founding of the Compagnie, he could thus have Caron brought to 
France to advise on how best to secure the trade in the East. Caron recommended to 
build a headquarters on Bangka Island, off the east coast of Sumatra. Much like 
Dutch Batavia, this new settlement would form the center of a network of factories 
spanning the Indian and Chinese ocean. He also drew up letters and lists of gifts to be 
sent to local rulers.
191
 
To govern the CFIO abroad a cadre of experienced colonial officials and 
navigators was needed. Colbert had been so convinced with the presentation of Caron 
that he appointed him to the post of director, with full power to carry out his plans. 
To further bolster the ranks of officers, twenty-three specialists in navigation and 
Asian commerce were hired, as well as thirty ship pilots. As France itself had only a 
small supply of such men, other sources were called upon. Most of the cadre was 
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hired from abroad, and many had one link or another with the VOC, showing the 
prominence of the debt owned by the new corporation to the old.
192
 
By joining a rival company such ex-servants of the VOC gained for 
themselves the permanent wrath of their old employer. It was not uncommon for 
lower servants to join other companies, in disregard of the stipulations in their 
contract. However, in the case of Caron it became akin to high treason, as he had in 
depth knowledge of the East through his prior positions. It was the luck of Caron that 
the Dutch at the time were in conflict with the English, and could therefore scarce 
afford a conflict with the French.
193
 De La Tesserie, due to his lowly position with the 
VOC, would probably not have had the same amount of trouble, but it would 
nonetheless have constituted a breach of faithfulness to offer his services to the CFIO. 
 
8.2 New choices 
 
The impact of the recent power struggle and external threat of the Iroquois must have 
been profound for de La Tesserie himself. As part of the group of supporters first of 
d’Avaugour and later de Mézy, he had to contend with the actions of the circle 
around the vicar de Laval.
194
 Because of this, his fortunes waxed and waned with 
those of the administration in general. Although de La Tesserie had become interim-
governor after the departure of d’Avaugour, he lost the position with the arrival of de 
Mézy. Subsequently, when de Mézy’s conflict with de Laval expanded, de La 
Tesserie was brought back in as supporter of the beleaguered governor. However, the 
death of de Mézy and the arrival of de Tracy ensured his dismissal from the Council 
for a second time. Because the victory of the clergy over the colonial administration 
now seemed secure (the new measures undertaken by de Tracy would not yet have 
shown), it might have seemed to de La Tesserie that his options in the administration 
had been permanently wrecked. To a man in his late thirties this might have seemed 
an unpromising prospect. 
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Furthermore, other possibilities were barred by the continued warfare with the 
Iroquois. His own wife, together with her prior husband, had gathered renown (and 
probably headshaking at their folly) earlier by becoming the first French seigneurs to 
actually go and live on their estate.
195
 This was not an example followed by many; 
few other colonists ventured far from the forts of the major towns in fear of being 
caught and killed by Iroquois war bands, and lands everywhere in the colony went 
untended.
196
 The seigneurie granted to him by d´Avaugour and those belonging to his 
wife, would equally have remained scarcely cultivated. 
The fur-trade also suffered. The Iroquois had exterminated the Huron allies of 
the French, and although new tribes were filling the void, the Iroquois still controlled 
the major waterways through which the goods could be brought to the colony. 
Because of this, the number of skins brought to the colony from the American 
hinterland had diminished rapidly as compared to a decade back.
197
 With the 
withdrawal in May 1663 of the monopoly granted to him and his fellow merchants by 
d’Avaugour, de La Tesserie had also lost his share of the trade passing through 
Tadoussac, the only relatively untouched area still left to the French. 
These troubles must have left him in a difficult financial position. When 
writing to du Fresnes, de La Tesserie sent along a gift of two beaver skins, which he 
himself admitted were in a bad state. Furthermore, in the case that du Fresnes would 
accept his appeal, de La Tesserie asked for a sum large enough to pay for the crossing 
to be included. Because his incomes were mostly constituted from agricultural 
products and what money there was went into buying necessities from France, de La 
Tesserie had little money to pay for his voyage to Europe. It was a sorry state for a 
French nobleman to be in, and he would no doubt have been sorely inclined to go 
look for his fortune elsewhere.
198
 
By the time of writing, halfway into 1666, de La Tesserie was thus a still 
relatively young man, who had been thrown out of the political center of the colony, 
and also had a bleak future where his own personal and financial safety were 
concerned. Other reasons might also have been important in his search for a potential 
new occupation. His wife, aged forty-seven, was ten years his senior and would have 
already been passed her childbearing age: we know from the sources that she would 
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never give de La Tesserie a child. His connection with his adopted family might 
therefore have been weak (although we have seen he took care of his stepchildren 
regardless).  
In his letter de La Tesserie also claimed that the climate of Nouvelle-France 
was not to his liking, and that he would rather reside in warmer environments.
199
 He 
stated that he was more intimately acquainted with the countries and the peoples of 
the East than he was with those of his current home.
200
 Such a statement might be 
simple embellishment, but many of the men who returned from long stays abroad 
would often look back with pleasure on their time in the east.
201
 Simple wanderlust 
and a sense of adventure might also have formed the nature of his actions, a trait not 
uncommon with those who have travelled a lot.  
 
8.3 The application of de La Tesserie 
 
We cannot know from the sources how de La Tesserie actually heard about the 
founding of the CFIO. His first encounter might have been the request of du Fresnes 
for his travel account itself. He might also have heard of the new endeavor through 
family or friends at home. We know that he still maintained contact with contacts in 
La Rochelle, through whom he asked for du Fresnes’ reply to be sent back to him.202 
More convincing is that he took knowledge of it directly. It can be gleaned from the 
sources that de La Tesserie was in France between February and June 1664.
203
 It is 
possible that he had been summoned to Paris much like Caron had been to inform 
Colbert upon the workings of the VOC. More likely however is that he was in France 
for different reasons, and while there heard of the CFIO, consequently offering his 
services as informant. 
Regardless of the manner in which de La Tesserie heard from the new 
venture, it is clear from the text that he considered himself a capable addition to the 
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CFIO.
204
 The travel account and letters, in essence an extended application letter, are 
replete with mentions of his own actions and capabilities. We have already 
encountered his acquired skills in languages and colonial administration, as well as 
that of fortifications and colonial warfare. In his first letter de La Tesserie also 
dwelled specifically upon his skills as navigator and his in depth knowledge of the 
economic and political situation in the Far East, something he states is in short supply 
with those already hired by the CFIO.
205
 Stressing these points would have been 
especially important, as they were exactly the abilities the directors of the company 
were looking for. 
Interesting is also the fact that de La Tesserie stressed his Catholic credentials 
several times in the text. Although he has no problem mentioning his Huguenot 
heritage in his account (and we have seen that a Huguenot past is not necessarily an 
obstacle for ambitious men), there are several instances in which he disparages the 
anti-Catholicism of the Dutch. He mentioned the aid given by the Dutch to the 
Japanese in the repression of its Catholic converts, in which large numbers were 
killed.
206
 Another is of the Dutch refusal to baptize infants of its Catholic native allies 
on Formosa.
207
 
More telling is an anecdote of the trial and expulsion of a Jesuit priest in 
Batavia. De La Tesserie mentioned that while in Batavia, the Dutch authorities had 
apprehend a Jesuit priest who had been trying to travel back to France on ships of the 
VOC after a mission in Vietnam.
208
 The priest had tried to give spiritual guidance to 
the Catholics in Batavia, from which they were barred by the Dutch. The Jesuit was 
apprehended while giving mass, and he and his congregation were imprisoned. Most 
of the convicted were released on a fine, but the priest was banished to Bantam after 
the Catholic community paid his fine, and his belongings were burned. What was 
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especially galling in the eyes of de La Tesserie was the fact that the Jesuit had been 
sent away from Vietnam because he had interceded in favor of the Dutch with its 
king, who had wanted to execute them for an affront done to him. Disgusted, de La 
Tesserie stated that such was the payment given by the Dutch to all those who helped 
them.
209
 
Lastly, de La Tesserie mentioned the fact that the colonial administration 
under Talon would be loath to let him go, due to his good services. He also 
mentioned that if the CFIO was disinclined to hire him, he would instead undertake a 
mission for Talon to discover the northern parts of the continent. As mentioned 
above, de La Tesserie would rather have wanted to serve the Compagnie in the East, 
but he nonetheless set out an alternative option, probably to pressure du Fresnes into 
action.
210
  
It is clear that de La Tesserie was painting a picture of himself which would 
appeal to the management of the CFIO. He set himself down as a career official, who 
held specific knowledge in an area little-known in France, as well as many skills 
necessary for the reaching, setting up and defending of colonial positions. By 
avowing his Catholic credentials and his services for the colonial administration of 
Canada, de La Tesserie made himself imminently acceptable to the bureaucratic 
machine behind Colbert and Louis XIV. The fact that he was capable of discerning 
what the French government would be most interested in obtaining, and how he 
would fit in the best in said picture, is a clear indication that de La Tesserie was very 
much aware of potential difficulties in background, and was quite willing to adapt or 
change some parts of his identity to suit his needs. As mentioned earlier, for someone 
who had travelled as extensively as him, such cosmopolitan skills would have been of 
the highest importance in successfully integrating in the various environments 
encountered.  
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Chapter 9: Rejection and later life 
 
Although de La Tesserie´s credentials were solid, it was a different proposition 
entirely if the CFIO would hire him. Furthermore, forces outside of his control could 
change circumstances at home to such an extent that his personal need for the change 
might be invalidated, as we will see in this final chapter. 
 
9.1 Failure of the CFIO.  
 
The last letter of de La Tesserie was dated the 8
th
 of November 1666. This meant that 
he would have been too late to join the main fleet, which had sailed from France on 
the 14
th
 of March 1666. This fleet was supposed to head for India to fulfill Caron´s 
design, and it included Caron himself and many other high dignitaries. After a stop at 
the French colony of Madagascar the fleet arrived at Surratt on the 13
th
 of February 
1668. Due to infighting between the directors and traders however, the French were 
unable to do more than secure trading rights from the Mughal Emperor, and land to 
build a factory near Surratt. The arrival of reinforcements allowed Caron to also 
secure a trading post at Masulipatnam, on the western coast of India, a year later, and 
another French trading post was opened at Pondicherry shortly afterwards. Caron´s 
aim of creating a French Batavia in the Indonesian Archipelago however proved a 
failure, and the French were unable to expand their influence outside of the Indian 
subcontinent.
211
  
 Nor did the financial state of the French East India Company aid in the matter. 
As mentioned earlier, the Compagnie had difficulty raising the sums necessary for its 
designs from the French populace, driving it into the arms of Colbert and the King. 
This source also dried up however, as French military activity in Europe increased 
after 1667. Furthermore, what income the Compagnie obtained from shipments of 
goods from India did not balance the costs made. These shortcomings ensured that 
the Compagnie was unable to send out more than a couple of ships each year, which 
were sufficient only to maintain its holdings in India itself. The death of Caron in a 
shipwreck on the 5
th
 of April 1673 proved the end of the modest period of 
expansion.
212
 
                                                          
211
 A. Ray, The Merchant and the State: The French in India, 1666-1739, vol. 1 (New Delhi 2004) 42-
47. 
212
 This is not to say that Caron was the primary driving force behind the French East India Company. 
Dissention within the ranks, and animosity between Caron and Colbert had already convinced the latter 
to dispense with the former. However, Caron was the visionary, and his death ensured that the 
74 
 It is clear that the shortage of success and the dearth of funds would have 
made the French East India Company disinclined to hire de La Tesserie. His 
knowledge rested upon a specific area of the globe in which the French had few 
interests, and the strength of the East India Company was not such that this situation 
could be rectified quickly. Furthermore, the small number of ships being dispatched 
to the east every year would only have required a few trained navigators, who could 
as easily be recruited from the French naval towns, or from neighboring countries. In 
the end, the positions which the French East India Company could offer de La 
Tesserie might simply not have been sufficiently appealing. 
 
9.2 The pacification of the Iroquois tribes 
 
The fact that the CFIO might not have needed the talents of de la Tesserie for their 
endeavors might not have been the only reason. As mentioned earlier, Nouvelle 
France had been a colony wracked by warfare with the Iroquois tribes. A first 
expedition had already set out under the command of de Courcelle at the beginning of 
January 1666, but proved an abject failure.  
 The French campaign had caused bad blood with the English, who had taken 
the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam shortly before. To this end, the French sent out 
an embassy to discuss with them how to deal with the Iroquois. This embassy was 
made up by two priests, and de La Tesserie had been added as interpreter as the town 
of Albany was still predominantly Dutch. However, the delegation was forced to 
abort its mission at Trois-Rivières in July 1666 because several Frenchmen, including 
a nephew of de Tracy, had been murdered by Iroquois. Because of this, the French 
decided to deal with the Iroquois once and for all.
 213
 
 The timing of the mission had been auspiciously chosen. Both internal 
dissention within the Iroquois Confederacy and hostile pressure from without had 
convinced most of its members that peace should be made with the French. This 
would enable the Confederation to use their full military strength to confront other 
native American tribes who had been intruding on the Iroquois hunting fields. Only 
the Mohawk, who lived between the French and Dutch colonies, and therefore 
profited most of the continued warfare with the French, were opposed. By convincing 
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the Mohawk to desist from raiding, the French would therefore be able to sign a 
peace with the Iroquois.
214
 
 To this end the French assembled a new force to march on the Mohawk 
villages. According to Charlevoix, who wrote some eighty years after the events, over 
one thousand men were assembled for the campaign. Although the march proved 
hard, the French reached the Mohawk villages in fighting condition. However, the 
Mohawk had been forewarned by scouts of the approach of the French, and had fled 
their villages. The French found only some elderly left behind, whom they 
imprisoned. De Tracy and de Courcelle were thus denied their confrontation with the 
Mohawk once more.
215
 Although a confrontation did not take place, the expedition 
was not a complete failure. The French put the village to the torch, together with the 
winter provisions stored there. De La Tesserie was not present with this expedition 
because of an illness, although he also gave a short summary of its results in his 
second letter, which corroborates closely with the above account of Charlevoix.
216
 
The show of force proved enough to bring the Mohawk to the negotiation table, 
swiftly followed by the other Iroquois tribes. By early 1667 the Iroquois and the 
French were finally at peace.
217
  
 
9.3 Talon and the reintroduction into the Sovereign Council 
 
The arrival of de Tracy and Talon not only heralded a new period of peace within the 
colony, but also opened a new (and as it would prove final) round of reorganizations, 
which would stabilize the colony and firmly subjected it to the crown of France.  
 During the months in which he was shunted from the Sovereign Council, de 
La Tesserie seemed to have built up a relationship with the new intendant Jean Talon. 
In his final letter he indicated that Talon was contemplating on sending an expedition 
to reconnoiter the northern waters, and that he wanted de La Tesserie to head this 
mission.
218
 Furthermore, in August 1666 Talon sent de La Tesserie to the Bay of St. 
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Paul to investigate mining possibilities there.
219
 It seemed that Talon was inclined to 
make good use of the myriad skills which de La Tesserie had learnt in the course of 
his career, ranging from his political skills to his navigational background. Nor was 
this exchange one-way. When discussing the possibilities of remuneration for his 
traveling costs, de La Tesserie mentioned that Talon was willing to act as a go-
between. De La Tesserie also mentioned that both Talon and de Tracy had been 
happy with his activities in Nouvelle-France, and word of this might also have 
reached France, facilitating his affirmation of nobility on the 23
rd
 of July 1667.
220
  
  It is quite possible that de La Tesserie had become a supporter of Talon. 
Interestingly, this would have brought him into opposition with the clergy for the 
third time. Talon had royal orders to turn back the power of the clergy in the colony, 
de facto a carte blanche to rearrange the power structure itself. A large step had 
already been made by excluding the bishop from the process of choosing a new 
councilor for the Sovereign Council. Talon also weakened the regulations binding the 
trade of liquor to Indians, to the point that its sale was tolerated, if not outright 
allowed. When the Sovereign Council was reorganized for the last time at the 
beginning of December 1666, two councilors were dropped who had had a history of 
being supporters of the clergy.
221
 The reasons for the subsequent appointment of de 
La Tesserie to one of the vacant seats in Sovereign Council on the 6
th
 of December 
might thus have been an explicit move by Talon to weaken the hold of the clergy on 
the Council (if not in simple recognition of de La Tesserie’s exertions made on behalf 
of the colony or of Talon himself). 
 
9.4 The French colonial bureaucrat 
 
The peace with the Iroquois held, and from 1667 onwards the lands surrounding the 
towns became safe to travel and cultivate again. It is therefore not unreasonable to 
think that de La Tesserie´s renewed importance in the colony, as well as the 
opportunity to finally start developing his lands in earnest, might have permanently 
cancelled any plans of moving elsewhere. As icing on the cake, de La Tesserie’s 
lands on the Ile d’Orleans were raised to the status of a seigneurie with the name of la 
Groezardi rre.222 In Canadian society, where the status of seigneur was the highest 
attainable to its inhabitants (if not always mirrored with corresponding wealth), this 
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raise would have put de La Tesserie at the pinnacle of the colonial hierarchy, and was 
a clear indication of the trust put in him by the government.
223
  
 The final appointment of de La Tesserie to the Council and his registration as 
a nobleman with his own seigneurie would have indicated his amalgamation with the 
identity of a French colonial administrator. Du Bois Cahall made the interesting point 
that ‘[l]ong service in the King’s business, some knowledge of jurisprudence, and 
orthodoxy in religious matters, were qualifications most necessary for appointment to 
the Council. Many of the Councilors had shown some ability in places of trust, in 
business of a judicial or administrative or commercial or military character´.
224
 In the 
case of de La Tesserie, who most certainly had neither a long record of service and 
whose religious stance might have been suspect, appointments were thus clearly both 
the result of his capabilities, learnt in service of the VOC or the crown afterwards, 
and his attachment to and support of the policies and activities of the successive 
governments of d’Avaugour, de Mézy and Tracy and Talon. 
 Interesting in this case is de La Tesserie’s continued identification with the 
anti-clerical factions in the colony. Although to a large extent the result of the 
political wrangling which took place in the colony between 1661-1666, de La 
Tesserie’s alignment-choices might also indicate a less than orthodox view of the 
powers due to the clergy (potentially rooted in his Huguenot background). To the 
VOC and the French government of Louis XIV both, the clergy was envisioned as 
subjected to the demands of the secular government, even if both organizations 
propagated their respective religions through law and action. Even if de La Tesserie’s 
conversion had been an act of faith, his Huguenot upbringing might still have given 
him a certain measure of distrust where the clergy was concerned. It would however 
be remiss to state that this would have been the primary reason, and in any case there 
is no direct proof of it being so. 
 
9.5 Death and legacy 
 
Whatever his beliefs, de la Tesserie’s remaining years were entirely orthodox, 
compared to the preceding period. He was active in the regular dealings of the 
colony, such as the executions of wills and monitoring trade between Nouvelle-
France and the founding country.
225
 On the 8
th
 of August 1667 his nomination to the 
post of procurer-general, the head of the public prosecution service, is indicated, 
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when he had orders to control the process of clothing, which had eclipsed those set by 
the government. Ultimately however, until his death on the 16
th
 of June 1673 very 
little would happen in the colony.  
 De La Tesserie’s family situation was now also firmly in place. It is clear 
from Talon’s census of 1666 that all the children of de Grandmaison lived in the 
household of her fourth husband, until the time that they themselves were married.
226
 
It has already been noted that de La Tesserie was supportive of his stepchildren, 
providing several of the girls with substantial dowries and advantageous marriages. 
He might also have had a hand in the careers of his stepsons. The only son of the first 
family had first been given the patrimonial lands on the Ile d’Orleans, but quickly 
exchanged those for a new seigneurie formed out of part of the lands of his father 
near Trois-Rivières, subsequently named la Cheverotière. It must be remembered 
here that the senior branch of the Cailhauts in France had held a fief also called la 
Chevrotière. De La Tesserie must clearly have had a hand in the naming of the fiefs, 
and its name must have indicated the superior status in which these lands, then 
already a seigneurie, must have been held in regards to the lands on Ile d’Orleans, 
which did not confer the status of nobleman.  
The other part of those lands was given to another daughter from de 
Grandmaison’s second marriage, who together with her husband was granted the 
seigneurie of Deschambault. The remaining lands on Ile d’Orleans, called the 
Beaulieu fief after de Grandmaison’s third husband, were subsequently handed to her 
second son (the first having shown little interest in a career as seigneur). With the 
death of de La Tesserie it might have been expected for his lands to pass into the 
hands of his nearest inheritor, his brother in France.
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 For unknown reasons this 
however never happened. Instead de Grandmaison inherited the fief, handing it over 
to her youngest son upon her death, who thus came to own both the fiefs on the Ile 
d’Orleans, styling himself Gourdeau de Beaulieu et de la Grossardière. Of de La 
Tesserie and his inheritance little was thus left, except for the names he had given to 
the Chevrotière and Grossardière fiefs.  
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 From the information attached to the signed document of nobility from 1667, de La Tesserie was 
still the inheritor to the la Groezardière lands of his brother near Nantes. The birth of a nephew to his 
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Conclusion 
 
Thus ended the career of Jacques Cailhaut de La Tesserie. For all his travels and 
travails, he did not leave much of an imprint upon our history. In fact, there is so little 
that the man has not even been given his own entry in the Dictionary of Canadian 
Biographies, despite his undeniable historical importance to the early development of 
the colony. Instead, de La Tesserie has been relegated to several footnotes and a 
paragraph in the much more extensive entry of his wife. Of his time with the VOC 
nothing whatsoever is known, except for what has been saved through his own 
writings. In this, he is obviously far from unique, and the singular fact of uncovering 
such a life story is historically relevant.  
 However, the life of de La Tesserie also holds a myriad of lessons to be learnt. 
The first was the sheer mobility he displayed through his travels. During his lifetime, 
de La Tesserie travelled and fought in Western Europe, visited and traded in many of 
the important regions in the Far East, and lived and worked on the Northern Atlantic 
seaboard. The breadth of his peregrinations was such that they would set many a 
modern traveler to shame. The fact also that his life has not left many records might 
indicate that such mobility was potentially much more widespread, even on the lower 
levels of establishments. In this framework de La Tesserie clearly operated as a 
conduit in the knowledge network described in the work of Huigen and de Jong. 
Through de La Tesserie experiences and work methods as applied by the VOC on 
Formosa would also have found their way to the New World. Through such human 
connections the different areas of the globe were tied together. 
 To personally cope with the large differences in cultures which de La Tesserie 
encountered on his voyages (which probably would have had a much bigger impact 
on his sense of identity then would be the case in our own information-rich and 
globalized age), he needed to display a high level of adaptability. It seems that de La 
Tesserie was well capable of such adaptation, for he apparently learnt the local 
languages and took notice of and participated in local customs. De La Tesserie also 
seemed to have easily integrated into the local power structures as he encountered 
them, and seemed able to correctly deduce what self-image was required where, and 
respond by changing accordingly. 
 However, such flexibility and adaptive capacities were not necessarily always 
present with all travelers in this time period, or necessarily with equal intensity in all 
cases. There have been several instances noted in this paper of those who seemed 
unable or unwilling to adapt to the circumstances, and who suffered discrimination 
and professional stasis as a result. This indicates that even if a certain 
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cosmopolitanism in interacting with others was a requisite to integrating, the fact that 
some people travelled long distances not necessarily indicated that such men were 
learning, or inclined to learn, anything from their new surroundings. It would seem 
that even if mobility and interaction increased, this did not necessarily mean a 
broadening of the cosmopolitan spirit.  
  In effect, such border-crossing experiences could have a negative impact as 
easily as a positive one. The structural discrimination on linguistic-cultural ground 
implemented by the VOC on its servants in the East (and the Company was by no 
means an exception in this respect) might have pushed its servants to identify 
themselves with just those categories through which they were being differentiated, 
instead of trying to adopt the trappings of the principal category. Groups foreign to 
the Dutch Calvinist identity of the VOC hierarchy were in effect put before the choice 
to either adopt said identity, or to affirm their differences instead. Those who chose 
the last option in reaction became liable to be shunted from sources of power and 
connection necessary to support their own position. Instead, such support might have 
been found within the groups of those with similar backgrounds, and similarly 
ostracized. As men were drawn to those of their own city, region or country, a belief 
in a shared identity might have been formed, even if it had not existed prior to their 
voyage abroad. In a sense, what these men might have brought back was an idea of 
what they shared, and what set them apart from those surrounding them.  
 For all his adaptational prowess, this even seemed to have happened to de La 
Tesserie. Although he had shown loyalty and skill in the service of the VOC, de La 
Tesserie was quick to return to France when faced with a temporary personal setback. 
There, instead of reaffirming his affiliation with the French Huguenot communities of 
which he was a member, de La Tesserie made the choice to convert to Catholicism, 
and ship out to a French colonial holding, in which Huguenots were not allowed. By 
doing so, he rejected his own background, and instead changed his identity (or at least 
the public representation thereof) to that considered a model Early Modern 
Frenchman: i.e., Catholic and loyal to the crown.  
 To conclude, it must however not be forgotten that such abstract thinking 
about loyalties, such as described above, were more often than not not at the forefront 
of the minds of those in whom they clashed. Instead, the case of de La Tesserie shows 
that his choices, including his conversion to Catholicism, were largely pragmatic in 
nature. His decisions were often driven by chance and skill, and the possibilities, 
which opened up to him were more often than not dependent upon his prior history 
elsewhere. It is highly indicative that, even though the colonies in which de La 
Tesserie worked seemed to have had different cultural exteriors, the inner workings 
81 
 
and problems of Formosa and Nouvelle-France were actually very similar. De La 
Tesserie might have specifically chosen to go to Nouvelle-France exactly because he 
had earned valuable experience while worked on Formosa. Similarly, he also 
believed that he would be of great service to the CFIO in Asia exactly because he 
knew the region intimately.  
 By and large, the story of de La Tesserie, as portrayed above seems to indicate 
that cosmopolitanism would have been to many neither an ideology of interaction, 
nor that it was the product of interest in differences between peoples. Instead, to 
many travelers being cosmopolitan would in the end have been a pragmatic choice, as 
it was necessary to integrate in their host societies if they hoped to flourish.  
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Map 1. Travels of de La Tesserie in Europe
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Map 2. Travels of de La Tesserie in Asia
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Map 3. Dutch Formosa
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Map 4. Travels of de La Tesserie in the Atlantic region
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Map 5. Quebec and the Ile d’Orléans232 
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